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Baseball's Steroid Era put many different high-profile athletes under pressure to explain
steroid allegations that were made against them. This thesis used textual analysis of news reports
and media portrayals of the athletes, along with analysis of their image repair strategies to
combat those allegations, to determine how successful the athletes were in changing public
opinion as evidenced through the media. The contexts, media reports, and strategies of Jason
Giambi, Mark McGwire, Andy Pettitte, and Roger Clemens were analyzed and revealed
important implications involving effective use of image repair strategies. They provided a deeper
framework for the success of mortification strategies. An authentic, sincere mortification strategy
has more power to change the media's reporting and portrayal of the athlete, while stunted or
incentivized mortification strategies provide diminishing results. The four different situations of
the players and the different combinations of strategies used provide insight into how much a
public persona matters in confronting allegations. They show how ineffective the strategy of
minimization is against allegations that involve on-field performance. The situations reveal how
the promise of future on-field actions, along with actual on-field success can help repair an
athlete's image without a solid rhetorical strategy. They show the amount of information offered,
along with the strategies used, influences the amount of persuasion that occurs. The different
situations also showed how a complete image repair strategy is successful in ending news
coverage of the allegations and not just changing the media portrayal.

Keywords: textual analysis, apologia, image repair strategies, baseball, steroids, HGH, Mark
McGwire, Jason Giambi, Andy Pettitte, Roger Clemens
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Introduction
The game of baseball needed to change with the times. The traditional pastime
had lost ground because of a player's strike in 1994, which not only canceled the final
two months of the regular season, the playoffs, and the World Series, but caused fan
interest to plummet because of the bickering of millionaire players and billionaire
owners. Outside the game, the National Football League (NFL) was pushing its fastpaced and more physical game into the nation's spotlight and the fans were responding.
Into this environment, Major League Baseball commissioner Bud Selig, the owners, and
the players tried to rediscover fan interest. Two divisions had been expanded to three and
a wild card team was added to the playoffs in 1994. Interleague play was voted on after
the strike and implemented in 1997, which led to baseball's second highest season
attendance in history (Koppett & Koppett, 2004). In 1998, two additional teams were
added to the major leagues in Arizona and Tampa Bay, while players became bigger and
stronger as home runs began to attract more and more fans to ballparks.
Just four years after the strike, Major League Baseball had found its saviors. The
red-headed St. Louis Cardinals slugger Mark McGwire and the lovable outfielder for the
Chicago Cubs Sammy Sosa put on a show during the summer of 1998 the likes of which
no one had ever seen before. They both chased Roger Maris' single season home run
record and battled each other all summer long and into the autumn. McGwire finished
with 70 home runs and Sosa settled for second with 66, pushing Maris into third.
America had paid attention all summer, not just Cardinals and Cubs fans, but the nation
as a whole. While it had taken 37 years to break Maris' record of 61, Barry Bonds broke
McGwire's record three years later by hitting 73 homers in 2001. Everything that had
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been so great about the 1998 season and baseball's innocence began to be questioned. A
Sports Illustrated piece (Verducci, 2002, June 3) focused on steroids and included
statements from former National League Most Valuable Player (MVP) Ken Caminiti,
who gave credibility to the growing rumors and accusations of the clubhouse culture of
using steroids to enhance recovery, performance, or to simply add muscle.
Drug testing for steroids in the minor leagues had started in 2001. In June 2002,
the Senate Commerce Committee told Selig and the MLB Player Union representative
Donald Fehr that testing would have to be a part of the next collective bargaining
agreement. Major League Baseball conducted tests in 2003 and found 5 to 7 percent of
the players tested positive for steroids. That winter, the Bay Area Laboratory CoOperative (BALCO) facilities were raided by federal agents after a tip from track and
field athlete Trevor Graham about certain undetectable steroids and human growth
hormone (HGH) being manufactured and distributed there. During the off-season, a
grand jury formed to look into the matter subpoenaed seven major league baseball
players who had some connection to the designer drug maker. In 2004, MLB was again
chided by the Senate for too lenient drug testing and players and owners eventually
agreed to a 10-day suspension for the first positive test. A year later, after more pressure
from Capitol Hill, MLB extended that first strike suspension to 50 games and the third
offense to a lifetime ban.
By 2006, Jose Canseco had released Juiced, a tell-all from his days as a player
and steroid user. Mark Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams (2006) released Game of
Shadows, which was an expanded version of their newspaper reporting for the San
Francisco Chronicle on the athletes involved in the federal BALCO investigation. These
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two books, along with plenty of rumor and conjecture in the press, had heightened
tensions between players, owners, the media, and fans. Former player and manager Dusty
Baker likened it to McCarthyism ("Regarding steroids," 2004, Feb. 24).
Arizona Diamondbacks relief pitcher Jason Grimsley was implicated in 2006 in
accepting HGH shipments as part of the expanded BALCO investigation by the federal
government. This investigation was eventually piggybacked by MLB as it appointed
former Senator George Mitchell to report on performance enhancing drugs (PED) use in
baseball. His report was released in February 2008 and 47 new players were implicated.
Other than the occasional player who tests positive, most of the media's reporting has
continued to focus on the past and those who tested positive during survey testing in
2003. Last year, in order to return without being a distraction for the entire season and
looking back on what the Steroid Era had caused to happen to him and baseball,
McGwire admitted to HGH and steroid use and said, "I wish I had never played during
the Steroid Era" ("Statement from Mark McGwire," 2010, Jan. 10).
Unlike some other sports, baseball's importance or significance rests in its
attachment to history. Comparing players to those who have come before makes the past
just as important as the present. In the decade that has passed with steroid suspicion and
investigation, player after player has stepped in front of microphones to address concerns
about PED use. Those players have uttered apologies, excuses, and denials. They have
done so under oath and in front of their teammates and the media. They have tried to
repair the perceived damage to themselves and to the game. They have tried to accept the
consequences of their past actions and others have misremembered to keep from being
skewered by the public upheaval against perceived cheaters.
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This thesis will use Benoit's (1995a) image restoration strategies, based in
rhetorical studies of apologia to analyze the statements of accused players in the press
and in front of Congress. Newspaper articles and columns, transcripts of interviews from
television, proceedings of House Committee hearings, and statements released by agents
and lawyers will provide the whole of the data that will be analyzed for apologia
strategies. This thesis discusses the context of the statements and provides a dominant
reading and analysis of media reports both before and after the apologia. In so doing, the
author also discusses the success or failure of the attempted strategies and the factors that
contributed to the outcomes. The purpose of the study was to find how high-profile
athletes reacted to steroid allegations and what strategies they used to attempt to repair
their public image. This study will show which strategies are useful in handling
allegations in a high-profile situation and what should be done when confronted with
allegations of a serious nature. This thesis will look at four highly visible baseball players
who were accused of using steroids or other performance-enhancing drugs between 2003
and 2008.
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Literature Review
Analyzing image repair strategies of athletes is a modern application of apologia.
The study of apologia dates back to Aristotle and it helped to form conflict resolution and
rhetorical criticism studies in the 1960s and 1970s and was incorporated into image
restoration and reparation strategies through the 1990s. A form of rhetorical discourse,
apologia is "designed to restore image, face, or reputation to alleged or suspected wrongdoing (Benoit, 1994, p. 418)." Benoit defined image as "the perceptions of the source
held by the audience, shaped by the words and deeds of that source, as well as by the
actor and other relevant actors (p. 418)." Apologic discourse involves manipulating,
balancing, or trying to change the perceptions of either the public or the pertinent publics
of an entity or person whose credibility or reputation has been challenged (Benoit, 1994).
In his seminal work, Benoit (1995a) analyzed the extant research on apologic strategies
and synthesized them in a typology representing five primary modes that include denying
allegations, evading responsibility for the action, reducing offensiveness of the action,
correcting the effects through new action, and apologizing and asking forgiveness for the
action. This typology, which represents a theory of image restoration, will serve as the
foundation of the analysis provided in this thesis. This literature review also will include
a summary of those ideas that inform Benoit's theory.
Abelson (1959) introduced four modes of resolution that resolve unbalanced
cognitive structures. Cognitive structures are formed when a relation is formed between
two cognitive elements, or relevant items for an individual. These elements can be
unbalanced or dissonant if, for example, a positive element is associated positively with a
negative element. In order to balance the structure, the positive element needs to be
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negatively related to a negative element. In order to accomplish this, Abelson explained
how denial, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence are used to balance structural
conflicts so there is not a belief dilemma and the relationship is in balance. Denial
changes the relationship through an attack on the cognitive elements in order to bring
them into balance. An example is attacking a held belief, such as eating three meals a
day, in order to change the behavior to eating five smaller meals each day. Bolstering
balances the structure by supplementing additional positive objects that relate to one of
the original elements. Bolstering occurs when the rhetor attempts to re-identify himself
with something viewed favorably by the audience (Abelson, 1959; Benoit, 1995a). As
Benoit explains, bolstering drowns out any imbalance by reassociating the speaker with
values or actions favorably regarded by the audience. Athletes often accused of breaking
the law, for example, use bolstering when they remind the media and their audiences of
the positive work done by charitable foundations bearing their names. Differentiation is a
tactic used to change the context in which an event or occurrence is viewed. Usually the
goal is to associate the situation with a broader and potentially more negative context
(Abelson, 1959; Benoit, 1995a). When the scrubbers failed at an Odwalla plant and
produced a batch of juice with the deadly bacteria e. coli, the company used
differentiation to suggest that the problem represented an even greater industry-wide need
to improve faulty processing, rather than a simple mistake limited to the company
(Thomsen & Rawson, 1998). Transcendence similar to differentiation, which changes the
context, places the situation or issue into a broader and potentially more positive context
(Abelson, 1959; Benoit, 1995a). An example might be an attempt to by a defense
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attorney who claims his client should be viewed as a hero, rather than a criminal, for
challenging an unpopular or unfair law.
Analysts have typically used these strategies to examine how politicians have
responded to attacks that have challenged their integrity and reputations. Rosenfield
(1968), for example, used these four modes to explain how Vice President nominee
Richard Nixon and President Harry Truman tried to repair certain accusations against
them and turn the balance of public opinion back in their favor. Nixon defended himself
against allegations of improperly using a campaign fund in his "Checkers" speech, while
Truman defended himself against claims he allowed a Russian spy to hold a high
governmental office. Rosenfield compared the two speeches of the politicians and noted
similarities and differences in the tactical use of apologia. Rosenfield found both
politicians denied the accusations and presented information to counter the claims. Both
also attacked their accusers to make them seem less credible. One interesting note is that
Nixon and Truman did not come up with new strategies for their speeches, but instead
used selected strategies from previous speeches, so the only new revelations were the
information presented along with the strategies. Rosenfield (1968) explained:
The speech in the moment of crisis is most likely to represent a climax, a
summing up, of those rhetorical thrusts which seem to have been most
effective with the public on previous dry runs. (p. 443)
Ware and Linkugel (1973) built on Abelson (1959) and Rosenfield (1968) and
argue apologia should be recognized as a distinct form of rhetorical discourse. They
claim its distinction from other forms of discourse is warranted because the pattern of
accusation followed by apology is prevalent in public addresses. A public accusation is
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only satisfied by a public, personal response. They noted that even with the presence of
legal representatives and public relations experts, a personal response still seems to be
required. This pattern arises from attacks on the character and worth of an individual and
to witnesses of the attack and to the accused, it can only be satisfied by a public apology.
Ware and Linkugel (1973) extended existing typologies of apologia, or what they
referred to as postures, by adding the concepts of absolution, vindication, explanation,
and justification.
The concept of absolution, they argue, includes aspects of denial and
differentiation and seeks acquittal from the accusation by denying the act and
differentiating the action from other, potentially worse actions. Absolution involves
denying any wrongdoing and differentiating attributes of the actor from the negative
beliefs of the public. Through denial and differentiation, the actor tries to remove his or
her responsibility from what occurred. Ware and Linkugel (1973) identified Nixon's
"Checkers" speech as taking an absolution posture because Nixon used denial and
differentiation strategies.
Ware and Linkugel (1973) also propose the posture of vindication, which uses
transcendence to raise the discourse above the specifics and details of the accusation to
preserve reputation and emphasize a greater worth of the actor to society. Ware and
Linkugel identified Truman's speech as having taken a vindication posture in defense of
his actions. Truman argued that what he did still protected the public interest and security
but he didn't refute his actions or facts of the case, only where the consequences fit with
regard to the nation as a whole.
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The posture of explanation involves bolstering and differentiation in order for the
audience to understand why the actions in question were taken. Ware and Linkugel
identified Edward Kennedy's Chappaquiddick address as having an explanation posture.
Kennedy tried to explain the situation so the audience understood his actions. The goal of
the explanation posture is to change the audience's perceptions of the rhetor's actions and
to help the audience see them as being more logical or reasonable than previously
assumed.
Bolstering and transcendence are combined in the posture of justification to better
foster understanding of the actions and actor. Bolstering adds positive elements to the
actor's character and transcendence places previous actions into a different context in
order to gain approval from the audience. This posture was used by Susan B. Anthony in
many of her speeches by comparing a woman's right to vote, which at the time was
illegal, to other crimes in support of her belief that citizens should be able to vote no
matter their gender.
Ware and Linkugel (1978) provided the foundation for the interaction and mixing
of apologia strategies into coherent postures and discourse. They also supported the
identification of postures as a more evaluative step in examining apologic discourse as a
complete decision involving an entire speech, instead of simply identifying individual
strategies within speeches and not relating one strategy to another. Ware and Linkugel
recognized there was added benefit to combining and mixing strategies for a specific
purpose, the four postures they identified are examples of how these interactions work in
harmony to absolve, explain, justify, or vindicate.
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Through the 1970s, apologia had primarily been defined based on looking at
political speeches. The accusations and defenses of politicians were easily identifiable
and readily apparent because the media covered more of them than other figures in the
public interest. With the advent of cable television and the growth in the number of
channels and the availability of specific financial news, the next segment of high-profile
accusations were aimed at businesses and CEOs who were being covered with the larger
media resources and more interest in important businesses. The next round of apologia
began to look at corporations and how they deal with accusations and attacks.
Image Repair Strategies
In Accounts, Excuses, and Apologies, Benoit (1995a) took prior apologia research
and applied it to business and political situations and put forth a theory of image repair
strategies. He examined the use of corporate speech (e.g., executive statements, public
relations and media relations strategies) to explore how organizations attempted to
minimize the consequences of crises brought about by product failures and even
corporate malfeasance. In developing a theory of image restoration, Benoit borrows the
modes of Abelson (1959) (denial, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence) and
combines those with some links to Rosenfield's (1968) attacks on the accuser and
providing more information strategies. Benoit also includes some combinations of Ware
and Linkugel's postures (1973), specifically justification and explanation. He also puts
forth contextual criteria that must exist to push a situation into the range of apologia.
Benoit makes several assumptions. First, communication is a goal-directed
activity (Benoit, 1995a). The specific communications to be looked at were made for a
reason, which in this case, goes right along with his second assumption that maintaining a
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favorable impression is an important goal. A favorable impression would have to be more
valuable to the person apologizing than the performance of the act in the first place or the
perception of the public toward the actor. The second portion of criteria that must be met
addresses the details of the attack on character or face. The two requirements for an
attack are: 1) an act occurred which is undesirable and 2) the individual is viewed as
responsible for it (Benoit, 1995a). With these assumptions and criteria satisfied, the
rhetoric, or responsive discourse, can be analyzed by applying the modes or discursive
strategies that comprise the theory of image restoration. These include denial, evading
responsibility, reducing offensiveness, taking corrective action, and mortification. Each is
explained below.
Denial. The attacked can use two forms of denial to try and clear his name. The
first is straight denial by either denying the act occurred or by denying that he was the
one who did it (Benoit, 1995a). Denying that one was the offender usually requires
shifting the blame to someone else.
Evading responsibility. There are four different individual tactics that comprise
evading responsibility. These tactics basically involve admitting that the act was
committed, but suggest that the responsibility for the actions should not fall so heavily on
the shoulders of the accused. The first strategy is provocation. The accused tries to
portray the act as having been performed in response to another wrongful act. The second
strategy is defeasibility, which implies that the accused had a lack of control over the act
or the necessary information to understand the consequences of the act. Successful
defeasibility paints the actor as neither being responsible for the action, nor control of its
outcomes (Benoit, 2006). The third strategy is for the accused to simply excuse the act
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and say the event was out of his or her control. The fourth and final strategy is for the
rhetor to claim that the act was committed with good intentions and with no intent to
harm anyone (Benoit, 1995a).
Reducing offensiveness. Benoit's third category of apologia is to attempt to
reduce the offensiveness of the act. Unlike the first two categories, reducing
offensiveness focuses on the effects of the action and tries to change the public's opinion
vis-à-vis the act and its consequences. Benoit (1995a) proposes six tactics that serve to
reduce offensiveness. First is bolstering, which is used to enhance the positive affect
toward the actor. Bolstering does not have to be related to the act, it just has to serve to
enhance the image of the actor. Coombs (1999) also refers to this as ingratiation which is
related to bolstering in that it reminds those affected of present or prior good performed
by the accused. In a sense, it suggests that the accused should be forgiven because, on
balance, he or she has performed many other good acts.
The second tactical approach to reducing offensiveness is minimization, which
represents an attempt to lessen the negative effects of the action by minimizing the injury
to the victim or victims. This tactic also has been referred to as justification (Coombs,
2006). The third tactic is differentiation, which tries to make the act appear less offensive
by separating it from, or comparing it to even worse acts (Benoit, 1995a). Abelson (1959)
commented on the many different ways objects can be differentiated.
They may be differentiated according to the internal content of the object,
the object as viewed in a social context versus a personal context, the
object as it is versus as it should be, the object as it is versus the object as
it will be, etc. (p. 346)
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In addition, objects can be just as easily differentiated from expectations and how the
object would be in the future.
The fourth tactic for reducing offensiveness is transcendence. Transcendence
places the act in a different light or changes the frame of reference. Transcendence can
appeal to a higher law or to the greater good (Benoit, 1995a). The fifth tactic to reduce
offensiveness is to attack the accuser. The goal is to reduce both the credibility of the
attacker and the claim, often portraying the accused as being a victim. It can also be used
to divert attention from the original accusation and put the pressure on the attacker
(Benoit, 1995a). The sixth and final tactic to reduce offensiveness is compensation. When
employing this tactic, the actor tries to counterbalance the offense by offering some form
of compensation. Examples of compensation would include donating money to
organizations that represent offended groups or pledging time to work with those who
were offended or injured. Benoit (1995a) wrote that compensation functions as a bribe to
make the offended forget the action.
Corrective action. Benoit's fourth category of apologia is corrective action. The
actor vows to correct problems by fixing the situation and putting it back as it was prior
to the offensive action or by changing his or her future behavior to make sure it does not
occur again (Benoit, 1995a).
Mortification. The fifth category of apologia is mortification. In mortification,
the actor admits responsibility and asks for forgiveness. Mortification is sometimes only
half completed. If the actor does not take responsibility for his or her actions, simply
asking for forgiveness does not always have the effect of full mortification, or appearing
to be genuinely repentant.
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Benoit used these strategies to look at not only some political speeches, but also at
corporate crises such as those experienced by Coca-Cola and Pepsi (1995a), Union
Carbide (1995a), and Exxon (1995a). Benoit, for example, used these tactics to analyze
attacks and defenses between Coke and Pepsi in more than 40 advertisements in a trade
journal. He found that each company developed conflicting attacks or defenses over time
and no single attack provoked a solitary response. Benoit summarized four important
principles to guide evidence and arguments from his study. First, avoid making false
claims, second, provide adequate support for claims, third, develop themes throughout a
campaign, and fourth, avoid arguments that may backfire.
Benoit (1995a) analyzed public relations and not advertising when he dealt with
Union Carbide and Exxon. After a chemical cloud was released at a plant in Bhopal,
India, Union Carbide expressed regret for their actions and promised corrective action.
Union Carbide later tried to shift blame to a company chairman (who had been arrested)
and differentiate Union Carbide as an organization providing aid and not the party
responsible for the disaster. Benoit determined Union Carbide's image repair wasn't
effective because of its slow response and light corrective measures, but its image wasn't
as tarnished because the disaster took place in India and not in the United States.
In Benoit's (1995a) investigation of the Exxon Valdez spill and image repair
efforts, he found Exxon was ineffective. Exxon's early claims and attempts at
minimization were at odds with published reports. Exxon's attempt to blame the captain
of the ship also didn't work because the company was responsible for the actions of the
captain as well. Both of these facts undermined Exxon's efforts and led to an ineffective
image repair.
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During the mid-1990s, Benoit continued with more case studies. Benoit analyzed
Texaco's response to accusations of executive racism (Brinson & Benoit, 1999) and
found swift action and effective use of tactics can calm a crisis and move the media away
from the story. A racial discrimination lawsuit gained media attention when a tape of
Texaco executives was released to the press by the plaintiff's lawyers. Texaco's strategy
included bolstering, promising discrimination won't be tolerated in the future, saying they
were sorry, and shifting the blame to a few executives. Along with those tactics, Texaco
settled the discrimination lawsuit out of court. Texaco's actions effectively ended the
media firestorm and kept Texaco from further damage caused by the release of the audio
tape and the lawsuit.
Benoit also studied Sears' handling of its auto mechanics performing unneeded
repairs (Benoit 1995b). A California Department of Consumer Affairs investigation
found Sears performed unneeded repairs 90 percent of the time, and after being notified
continued to do so. After the report was made public, Sears attacked the Department of
Consumer Affairs, alleging it was politically motivated. Once a New Jersey investigation
was made public, Sears backed off and announced corrective action without admitting to
any wrongdoing or apologizing. According to Benoit, Sears' image repair was ineffective
because it used two contradictive strategies. After attacking the California Department of
Public Affairs many other states started inquires about Sears auto services. When the
New Jersey investigation was made public Sears' settlement undercut its previous
strategy and contradicted its previous remarks making the company appear even more
guilty.
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Benoit studied USAir's attempts to explain its safety record after a fifth USAir
flight crashed in five years (Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997). A Boeing 737 jet crashed
outside Pittsburgh killing 132 people in 1994. It was the worst of the five crashes over the
previous five years for USAir and the New York Times charged that USAir planes were
dangerous, management policies were to blame, and that those policies were in place to
save money. In response, USAir appointed the former commander in chief of U.S. Air
Forces in Europe to oversee its safety operations. USAir hired an independent third party
to audit all safety operations and ran an advertising campaign in 47 newspapers that
involved explaining these corrective steps as well as bolstering and denial. Even with
their efforts, Benoit found USAir's response not as persuasive as the accusations in the
Times and the image repair efforts were largely ineffective.
In a study that examined two widely recognized athletes, Benoit analyzed Tonya
Harding's apologia after an incident in which her ex-husband and two friends attacked
and attempted to break the knee of competitor Nancy Kerrigan during a practice session
during the 1994 U.S. Figure Skating Championships (Benoit & Hanczor, 1994). Benoit
and Hanczor solely studied the broadcast of Eye to Eye with Connie Chung when Tonya
Harding was interviewed. Benoit concluded that Harding chose her tactics well, but her
bolstering, denial, and attacking her accuser were ineffective because of her poor
performance on national television. The image Harding tried to present was not accepted
by the public and her defense hinged solely on her words, not on any evidence or facts. It
was difficult to believe her because she didn't provide any reasons to do so.
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Atonement
The rhetoric of atonement can be classified as a sub-genre of apologia. Atonement
is closely related to a combination of Benoit's strategies. It could, in fact, be classified as
a posture in Ware and Linkugel's (1973) study to be grouped with absolution, vindication,
justification, and explanation. Koesten and Rowland (2004) suggest that where traditional
apologia is used to defend one's character, "the rhetoric of atonement functions as a
purgative-redemptive device for an individual (p. 69)." The relationship is healed and
image restored through actions, instead of simply through rhetoric. Atonement could be
explained as a combination of mortification, corrective action and perhaps compensation
in Benoit's (1995a) image restoration strategies.
Koesten and Rowland (2004) portray atonement as necessary when there is not
another choice on how to proceed in the face of the crisis. It is more than restoring the
image of the individual. Atonement creates a new image for the redeemed individual or
entity, not just protecting the former image (Jerome, 2008).
Atonement involves a five-step process (Koesten & Rowland, 2004). First is to
acknowledge wrongdoing and to ask for forgiveness; this is essentially what Benoit calls
mortification. The second is to reveal a changed attitude about future behaviors and
persuade others that the rhetor is committed to not having this happen again. The third
criterion is to repair the situation through some form of restitution. The fourth criterion is
for the audience to view the evidence of the first three steps as authentic. The fifth
criterion is a public confessional, in which the actor gives evidence of this mortification,
allowing the public to make its own determination of the truthfulness of the atoning
claims (Koesten & Rowland, 2004).
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Simulated atonement. Simulated atonement is perceived as a less than fully
genuine attempt at atonement, Koesten and Rowland (2004) argue that full atonement can
occur when "a wrongdoer appears to come clean in admitting their guilt, while
simultaneously explaining the situation in a way that reduces their responsibility
(Shepard, 2009, p. 462)." Simulated atonement, on the other hand, occurs when the rhetor
appears more concerned with short-term effects. His attempt at atonement gives the
appearance of confession but at the same time seeks to lessen his or her responsibility.
Shepard (2009) wrote that simulated atonement works when two conditions are satisfied:
the act demanding apologia lacks salience for a significant portion of the audience and
when there are situational reasons for backing the actor (where the ends justify the means
or when an apology by the leader would cause more trouble to the audience).
Form
Benoit (1995) wrote that his focus in outlining his image repair strategies was
more to identify options for the critic's analysis rather than recommend which ones to
use. One of the reasons for this is that apologia is situation specific. Each situation is
different and the available options can be arranged to best fit what needs to be done.
Researchers who have looked at corporate crisis apologia have focused more on
recommendations and how the process should work. Coombs (2006) puts forward two
important aspects of crisis management: form and content. Rhetorical discourse falls in
the content portion, but the form factors into what was chosen and why it was used. In
other words, the context can matter almost as much as what is or is not said. The three
lessons of form that Coombs lists are to be quick, be consistent, and be open. Depending
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on its interpretation, being open either means being available to those involved or giving
a full disclosure of the situation and the rhetor's involvement.
Kaufman, Kesner, and Hazen (1994) listed five situations where full disclosure is
a viable option: when there is a continuing danger, when the organization is the victim,
when rumors are more damaging than the truth, when the organization can afford the
corrective action, and when a failure to disclose and respond to the crisis could be
financially crippling.
Hearit (1994) set forth five elements organizations should include in their
apologic responses: the account and frame of the accused, a statement of regret, some
form of disassociation from the act, actions to fix the act, and an explanation of how the
company has restored its values that were lost during the act. For his third element, Hearit
(1995) described three disassociation techniques that are closely related to reducing
offensiveness strategies. The first is opinion/knowledge disassociation, which argues the
complaint made against the accused is simply an opinion (or an interpretation of the act)
and does not match the facts. The second technique is individual/group disassociation,
which argues that a specific individual, and not the organization as a whole, bares the
responsibility for the act. The third technique is act/essence disassociation, which argues
the act was a departure from the normal way in which the actor behaves and is not
representative of his typical actions. Using disassociation techniques, the organization
could shift the blame away from itself by challenging the credibility of its attacker
claiming that the act was by, an individual, who does not represent the organization
proper, or by arguing that the act was an anomaly or exception to the rule.
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Sport Apologia
One specific context where apologia has become more prevalent is with regard to
athletes and other sports figures. Benoit's look at Tonya Harding (Benoit & Hanczor,
1994) was one of the early apologia studies of sports figures. Benoit also drew on some
previous sport-specific studies, such as Kruse (1981) and Nelson (1984). Kruse (1981)
discussed the challenge of balancing of fan's expectations for sports figures and their
teams when a player's inappropriate actions puts the equilibrium out of balance and some
form of apologia is needed to fix the problem. When circumstances threaten a team and
its performance, an apology is required to restore faith in the team. When an outstanding
player leaves a team, it is a threat because the team now has less talent and winning at the
same level is questioned. Overly casual or frivolous attitudes on the field of play are a
threat because the athlete isn't taking the game and his or her job seriously. An athlete not
playing to the best of his or her ability is a threat for the same reason. Kruse explained
that winning is the single principle that governs all of sports ethics. Any conduct that
might contribute to a team losing makes that athlete vulnerable to criticism or rejection
and in need of some sort of apologia to put the situation back in balance. Kruse (1981)
writes:
It is upon those who have violated the sport ethic to assure fans that
equilibrium has been restored, and a stable relationship exists between the
team and the fates (p. 283).
Kruse noted that most often sports figure apologies are brief, do not include many
details of what happened, but do try to make sure the balance has been restored in the
fan's perception. Nelson (1984) looked at Billie Jean King's apologia after a previous
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sexual affair was made public. King decided to first bolster and then to differentiate
herself from other gay athletes because she couldn't deny what had happened. King was
also an example of having third parties bolster for her, while she differentiated. Nelson
(1984) noted that different people could use different tactics for the same purpose and
still be effective, the tactics being used just can't be contradictory. Tonya Harding's
apologia was to deny she was involved with the planning and execution of the attack on
her rival, while King's approach was to address the issue as a legal matter. These contexts
threatened the athletes and their images and reputations in much the same way politicians
such as Edward Kennedy (Ware & Linkugel, 1973) or corporations such as Texaco
(Brinson & Benoit, 1999) had been threatened in previous studies.
As the sports media has become larger and more influential, fans have become
more informed and are more likely to demand an apology for something that they
perceive affects their team. As suggested by Kruse (1981), players or competitors who
have hurt the reputations of their sponsors or teams should produce apologies that create
a sense of equilibrium among fans and the public. In the 10 years since Benoit and
Hanczor (1994) examined the Tonya Harding event, sports case studies have become
more common. A Danish handball coach who essentially protested a game by not having
her team return after halftime was examined by Frandsen and Johansen (2007). Coach
Anja Andersen's apology the next day wasn't easily accepted because it was ambiguous
and not focused and failed to offer any facts or evidences to support her lack of
mortification. She didn't explain what actually happened and she only apologized to those
who demanded an apology and not because she was sorry for what happened. Bobby
Knight's speech after he was fired as head basketball coach at Indiana University was
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examined for its use of apologic transcendence (Hartman, 2008). Hart (2008) argued that
Knight successfully emphasized important values such as family, hard work, and the
place of basketball in the Indiana culture to move away from the specifics of his behavior
and the situation that led to his dismissal. Hartman wrote that taking advantage of
contextual details can add to the effectiveness of strategies – in this case traditional
heartland values.
Terrell Owens was examined for how it was perceived he acted after the
Philadelphia Eagles refused to renegotiate his contract and he became belligerent to both
the press and his teammates before the Eagles finally deactivated him from the roster
(Brazeal, 2008). Owens wasn't willing to apologize and Brazeal wrote that admitting
wrongdoing can be essential to a successful apology. Owens also damaged his feigned
attempt at apology by appearing less sincere in his other comments. He didn't offer
corrective action or value the culture of the NFL. A study which looked at how the press
performs apologia for an athlete was conducted analyzing how the Taiwanese media
perform image restoration strategies for native Major League Baseball pitcher ChienMing Wang (Wen, Yu, & Benoit, 2009). The Taiwanese media still portrayed Wang in a
positive light even when he pitched poorly, while the U.S. media didn't. The Taiwanese
media used evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness, and transcendence to repair
Wang's image. Wang was treated differently than other Taiwanese celebrities in the
Taiwanese press because unlike players in Taiwan he was representing all of Taiwan in
the major leagues and deserved to be collectively lauded and not judged harshly. Cyclist
Floyd Landis' apologia after his Tour de France title was stripped from him because of
positive drug tests accusations of doping was also examined in 2010 (Glantz, 2010).
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Landis wasn't effective in his image repair because his different strategies were
contradicted by either test results or other people's accounts. Even though Landis
received third party bolstering it wasn't unconditionally effective because of his
unsuccessful attempts at denial and defeasibility. Landis had used several excuses for
why he tested positive that didn't involve doping, but those poor attempts to excuse his
actions soured his latter attempts to clear his name.
Summary
This literature points to how athletes try to affect change on the public’s
perceptions of them, specifically what strategies they use and to some extent why they
need to do so in the first place. In order to view the success of these practices, four
baseball players and their apologic strategies following accusations of steroid and
performance enhancing drug use were analyzed for this thesis. News reports both before
and after their apologic statements were made public were examined to determine what
effects, if any, their apologia might have had on subsequent news reports and potentially
subsequently the public’s perceptions.
The three main research questions that will be addressed by this analysis included:
RQ1: How was the athlete portrayed in news reports during the allegations?
RQ2: What apologia strategies were used?
RQ3: How was the athlete portrayed in the media after his apologia and did this portrayal
suggest that the apologia was successful?
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Method
To investigate the possible success of the strategies that were used by suspected
baseball players from 2002-2010, the author conducted a critical textual analysis that
included both direct quotes from the players as well as news reports to determine a
dominant reading of the player's strategies.
Selection of Documents
The “texts” used as source documents for analysis in this thesis came from
newspaper articles, websites, transcripts from congressional hearings on the performance
enhancing drug use by major league baseball players, and books written by players
involved in the various PED scandals. News reports and press conference transcripts for
this study were compiled through Lexis-Nexis and Google News searches for the dates
prior to and after allegations, press conferences, or congressional hearings. These reports
were chosen based on national prominence and local expertise of the media outlet of the
athlete being studied. The day after most allegations or apologia, many newspapers ran
stories on the athlete and what the different parties said. From the larger pool of stories,
the more locally pertinent articles were chosen. For Jason Giambi, who was playing in
New York at the time, the New York papers provided more than enough articles to come
away with a dominant reading that reflected the breadth of newspaper portrayals of him.
For Roger Clemens and Andy Pettitte, the New York and Texas papers provided the
majority of the texts because they both live in the area and played for those teams. For
Mark McGwire, the needed texts came from major Midwestern papers in St. Louis,
Chicago, and Kansas City, in addition to major papers from other markets such as San
Francisco and New York. Search terms included the athlete's name, either press
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conference or hearing, whichever drug or other substance they were accused of taking,
and the year in which it happened. Previous textual analyses of newspapers have looked
solely at those pertinent articles (see, for example, Garyantes, 2006). These previous
studies were more narrowly focused and had fewer articles to consider. In comparison the
reports for this study will be limited to those that are both pertinent to the subject and
pertinent to the fans of that player and his team or those interested in the scandal itself.
With the amount of coverage some of the athletes received, redundancy of points of view
was easily discovered upon reading multiple news accounts. For this reason, the author
believes that five articles per player analysis provided a fair sample of media portrayals.
Congressional hearing transcripts were found through Lexis-Nexis by searching
for baseball under the congressional hearings search. The transcripts were then
downloaded and examined. Grand jury testimony was available for a few athletes in
Game of Shadows (Fainaru-Wada & Williams, 2006). Juiced (Canseco, 2005) was also
used as a reference because both Jason Giambi and Mark McGwire were featured
prominently in Canseco's allegations. These books were used to put things into proper
context and also as early portrayals of the athletes involved in the allegations. The four
ballplayers whose situations were studied covered most situations that have come up
during the Steroid Era.
Critical Textual Analysis
Procedure. According to Fursich (2009), critical textual analysis is a qualitative
method that,
is often chosen to overcome the common limitations of traditional
quantitative content analysis such as limitation to manifest content and to
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quantifiable categories. Textual analysis allows the researcher to discern
latent meaning, but also implicit patterns, assumptions and omissions of a
text. Text is understood in its broader, post structural, sense as any cultural
practice or object that can be ‘read' (p. 240-241).
The author believes that critical textual analysis applied to sports apologia can
further the reader's understanding of the image repair and restoration strategies
commonly used by major league baseball players accused of using performance
enhancing drugs.
"Dominant Reading." Critical textual analysis is a search for the dominant
reading of a text or the position of the reader with regard to the text. In other words it
looks for, "not the text itself, but what the text signifies (Curtin, 1995, p. 12)." This can
be laborious because texts can have many different meanings and interpretations. Part of
critical textual analysis is determining what ideological factors might influence the
reading or interpretation of statements. Recall (as previously noted in the review of
literature) that Bobby Knight’s apologic response drew from traditional farmland values.
In Indiana basketball culture, which was immortalized in the movie, Hoosiers (DeHaven,
Pizzo, & Anspaugh, 1986) hard-nosed coaches are expected to be given some latitude for
their behavior because of the general acceptance of hard work and the need to push
players to perform at their highest levels. As a result, coaching tactics and player-coach
relations are expected to be intense, particularly when once considers the Hoosier passion
for the game of basketball and the reverence and respect given to Indiana’s legendary
games, such as the Milan vs. Muncie Central game upon which the movie was based.
Understanding (and taking into account) this culture, enables the critic to “read” the
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apologic text in such a way that rhetorical appeals based on transcendence and bolstering
become clear and highly logical (if not anticipated). In the current study, the author must
consider the role of baseball, and, in particular, the role of baseball “heroes” in American
culture when determining message strategies and their effectiveness. The critic must
recognize the meaning of the “game” to both players and fans when interpreting, and
placing into context, the apologic claims
To determine the “dominant read” of the text, the author was required to decenter
the text in order to discover its framework. This included looking at each article's form,
appearance, rhetoric, style, and basically every significant feature: visual, linguistic, or
presentational. These also include every shift in tone or rhetoric, every change in balance
or content, and every move in implied logic (Curtin, 1995). The article’s codes, topics
and tones or assumptions were looked at, as well as the narrative structure. Its omissions,
metonyms, synecdoche, symbols, and metaphors will also be looked at (Curtin, 1995).
After this process was finished the text was reconstructed based on what was found. The
deconstructed parts were put back in the context of the producer and audience (Curtin,
1995).
Coding Apologic Statements. Using Benoit’s Theory of Image Restoration
Strategies, the apologic statements were coded and classified based on their fit into his
typology, after considering context, form, omissions and assumptions, and the
relationships presented between the athlete and others involved. These image restoration
strategies were placed into the context of the broader dominant themes that reflected each
player’s ideological approach to his situation. The analysis presented in this thesis is
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constructed around this typology, identifying or associating specific statements and
actions with one or more of Benoit’s restoration strategies.
The framework for the author’s analytical strategy can be found in Figure 3.1.
Trustworthiness
Peer Audit. As the analysis progressed, the author discussed interpretations and
implications with his thesis advisor following the process described by Lincoln and Guba
(1985) as a peer audit. This type of review, in which independent researchers are asked to
examine and confirm interpretations, allows the author to make a case for his delimitation
of the findings (and related theorizing) and, more specifically, the trustworthiness and
vigor of the conclusions (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Reinard, 2008).
Negative Case Analysis. Negative case analysis was also used in order to delimit
the author’s conclusions. Negative case analysis involved retroactively analyzing initial
observations to assess the adequacy of their fit against any emerging exceptions or
unseen effects occurring in the latter months and years of the scandal. Specifically, the
author re-reviewed all “texts” to determine if any interpretations could be made that
might runner counter to early conclusions.
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Figure 3.1 Preliminary Framework of Analysis
Decenter the Article
Form – how the article was constructed, what was in the lead, ranked importance of
information
Appearance – pictures included with article, design of page
Rhetoric – what arguments were being made for/against athlete or allegations
Style – how did the reporter approach the topic, rhetorical devices, structure
Journalism Category – news, editorial, feature
Significant Features
Visual – how everything fit together, what stands out looking at it
Linguistic – prose, questions, turns of phrase, what words are made to stand out
Presentational – as a whole what is important
Shifts in tone and rhetoric – changes during the article, is it consistent or different
Change in balance or content – what is used to determine importance, facts, opinions,
experts
Logic – the arguments made and what has to be accepted to accept the arguments as right
Codes – what codes are used to further the meaning of the article
Topics – what topics are mentioned or introduced to give meaning to the situation
Tones – what tone does the reporter take with the information
Assumptions – what is taken for granted that is understood by the reader
Omissions – what is not included, but probably could or should have been
Metonyms – term used as a substitute for another related term
Synecdoche – the whole used as a part or the part used as the whole
Symbols – what symbols are used to describe
Metaphors – what metaphors are used to describe
Apologia Strategies
Denial – denying the act or that they did it
Evading Responsibility:
Provocation – performed in response to someone else's actions
Defeasibility – had a lack of control with regard to the act, not responsible but
also not in control
Excuse – event was out of their control
Good Intentions – act committed with intentions not to harm anyone
Reducing Offensiveness:
Bolstering – enhance positive affect, character
Minimization – tries to lessen the negative effect by minimizing injury
Differentiation – makes act appear less offensive by separating it from worse acts
Transcendence – places act in different light or changes frame of reference
Attack Accuser – reduces credibility of the attacker and can portray accused as
victim
Compensation – counterbalance effect with some form of compensation
Corrective Action – correct situation by putting it back the way it was or by changing
future behavior
Mortification – admitting responsibility and asking for forgiveness
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Context
August 1998
In the summer of 1998, Mark McGwire was under a lot of scrutiny from the press,
first for trying to break Roger Maris' single season home run record and also because he
used androstenedione (andro), which was at the time perfectly legal in baseball, but was
banned by the NFL and by the International Olympic Committee. The andro furor began
thanks to an Associated Press reporter who followed McGwire for a few weeks during
the summer of 1998. AP reporter Steve Wilstein said he went out intending to write about
the excitement of the home run chase that was captivating the entire country. When he
found the androstenedione in McGwire's locker, he felt he had to make sure people knew
something phony was going on (Baumbach, 2009, Feb. 14). In his story which ran
August 21, 1998, a day after McGwire had hit home run No. 51, Wilstein wrote:
Sitting on the top shelf of Mark McGwire's locker, next to a can of Popeye
spinach and packs of sugarless gum, is a brown bottle labeled
Androstenedione.
For more than a year, McGwire says, he has been using the testosteroneproducing pill, which is legal in baseball but banned in the NFL, the
Olympics and the NCAA (Baumbach, 2009, Feb. 14).
McGwire responded the next day in Pittsburgh, "It's legal and nobody even
bothered talking to our trainers. There's absolutely nothing wrong with it (Cyphers, 1998,
Aug. 23)." He added, "Well I don't worry about it, because it's legal stuff, sold over the
counter. Anybody can go in there and buy it. There is absolutely nothing wrong with it,
period (Miklasz, 1998, Aug. 23)." St. Louis manager Tony LaRussa later tried to ban AP
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reporters from the clubhouse and said, "This guy goes to the gym every day and works.
All that hard work is being tainted by crap like this (Mullen & Simpson, 1998, Aug. 23)."
There was not anything to keep McGwire from taking andro, but the light that
was shed on it and the fact it was banned by the NFL, NCAA, and IOC started a
discussion in the press. The press was squarely in McGwire's corner and, in retrospect,
the whole incident showed the willingness of the American public and press to ignore
performance-enhancing drugs and the stain they were putting on the national pastime.
Andro was a relatively new commercially available supplement and did not have many
concrete findings in studies conducted by reputable medical researchers. As journalists'
research found out, the East German Olympic team had used it to cover up their steroid
use (Sauerwein, 1998, Aug. 25) and the NFL had banned it in 1996 (Miklasz, 1998, Aug.
24).
The lack of data with regard to its effects was taken to be a green light for its use
by the media and MLB, instead of a warning signal. McGwire compared it to food, which
"can be dangerous if you abuse [it](Miklasz, 1998, Aug. 23)." In a front page article in
the Kansas City Star, which did not describe what andro did or what its supposed effects
are, professor of medicine and endocrinology Neil Schimke said it was probably a
placebo (Bavley & Rock, 1998, Aug. 29). Technically, andro was classified as a dietary
supplement at the time and, did not fall under the Food and Drug Administration's
regulation. Further, there were no good scientific studies documenting that it even
worked (Sauerwein, 1998, Aug. 25). From this lack of evidence against andro, the media
portrayed the organizations that had banned it as being overly strict in their rules. The
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IOC was out of touch, the NFL was hypocritical, and the NCAA could not get out of its
own way (Miklasz, 1998, Aug. 24).
Another story that was prominent during the steroid era was the athlete's workout
routines. They would work out so hard so the results seemed reasonable, but it was
actually banned substances and supplements, such as andro or creatine, that allowed them
to work out so hard day after day. This defense was used to cover for McGwire's use of
andro. McGwire's health, diet, and workout routines made him who he was. He worked
hard and he was dedicated. He was healthier then, than he previously had been in his
career, because of his work and diet habits. These health and habit changes, he claimed
made him bigger and stronger; it certainly was not andro or steroids (Miklasz, 1998, Aug.
24). Some in the medical community supported this claim. Dietician Dr. William Hart at
Saint Louis University came to McGwire's defense.
Mark McGwire didn't get to be Mark McGwire's size by taking andro.
Mark McGwire got to be Mark McGwire by a lot of hard work and
training (Sauerwein, 1998, Aug. 25).
These supposed experts who had something to do with McGwire's habits did not
have much experience with performance enhancing drugs, and, as might have been
expected attributed McGwire's strength and increasing size to other things: the dietician
crediting it to diet and the trainer arguing it was a result of a good workout routine. Andro
apparently was not seen as a factor – at least for now.
The media seemed to accept these explanations. Since McGwire had always hit
home runs, andro was not doing it for him now. He was an established home run hitter.
He had set the rookie record and continued to belt homers even in years when he spent
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copious amounts of time on the disabled list. McGwire still has to stand in the batter's
box and make contact with the ball to hit a home run (Miklasz, 1998, Aug. 24; Bavley &
Rock, 1998, Aug. 29). Reports, McGwire's defenders claimed, were just snooping and
searching for dirt. Eventually, however, the story would shift its focus.
A week after Wilstein's article, the Kansas City Star ran a story on its Saturday
front page. It quoted endocrinologist David Snied, who said he was amazed that andro
was not on a banned list for MLB. He questioned why any substance that would enable
longer workouts and accelerate the process of building muscle was not considered a
performance-enhancing drug. The article also included strong statements from the IOC
and the NFL that claimed that andro should be classified as a steroid (Bavley & Rock,
1998, Aug. 29). The Star's article also mentioned that nutrition supplement company
GNC had stopped carrying it that summer, but this was all mentioned near the end of the
story. Never mind that the article included two incongruent stories: that andro was and
was not a steroid, it did and did not help, and it should and should not be used. The
article, clearly sided with McGwire in how it was written. The composition put andro's
usefulness in doubt at the beginning and then required the other facts to overtake that
doubt.
Perhaps, the most egregious head-in-the-sand behavior came from USA Today's
house editorial, which after covering the facts as everyone else had, finished with this:
You can wonder whether food supplements give McGwire and Sosa an
edge. But that's wasting the chance to study the game's primal beauty.
Huge arms flash around big shoulders, hit with fabulous power, then
nonchalantly clear the ragged air left by that shocking contact with a one-
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handed follow-through. The 61 record lies ahead; the 50 threshold is past.
And for now, there is only the uncoiling of a knife-fast swing:
Astonishing, sexy, rejuvenating. ("While serious," 1998, Aug. 25)
The andro controversy had simply distracted from the home run chase of 1998. It had not
spurned anyone to dig deeper. McGwire and Sosa were giving America what it wanted
and America did not want to look at what was going on behind the scenes even though
the smoke was starting to build. McGwire's handling of the controversy worked simply
because he really was not at fault for anything other than using a legal substance. In the
future, McGwire might have wanted to say a few things differently based on how his
situation would unfold, but that was obviously not apparent in 1998 when McGwire was
on top of the world. He played for the Cardinals until the end of the 2001 season when he
retired, leaving a $30 million two-year contract that had been agreed upon, but never
signed.
December 2003
Two years after McGwire retired, the federal investigation into BALCO came to a
head. During the summer of 2003, federal investigators were given a syringe with trace
amounts of a mysterious substance that turned out to be THG, which was later named the
"Clear." Federal investigators raided the BALCO laboratory that September and
convened a grand jury during the winter of 2003.
New York Yankees slugger Jason Giambi was subpoenaed by the BALCO grand
jury after the 2003 season. A week after Barry Bonds testified, Giambi went before the
grand jury. When he arrived at spring training at the start of the 2004 season, he was
referred to as the Incredible Shrinking Slugger because it appeared he had lost 40 pounds.
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Giambi said he had only lost four (Kernan, 2004, Dec. 3). Giambi only hit 12 homers in
2004 before fighting off a parasite and receiving treatment for a benign tumor on his
pituitary gland during the season. Rumors swirled about steroid use causing the tumor
and parasite, but that was never addressed publicly other than to confirm Giambi did in
fact have a parasite and a tumor. He was not able to work back to full strength and was
left off the postseason roster for the Yankees (Caldera, 2004, Aug. 12).
December 2004
It only took a year before Giambi's grand jury testimony was leaked to the San
Francisco Chronicle's two reporters Mark Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams. His
testimony shed light on what he had been doing and exactly what kind of person Giambi
was off the field. BALCO and Jose Canseco's book, Juiced, provided the furor that led to
the first congressional hearing about steroids that included many baseball players. These
documents lent a certain understanding not only to Giambi's situation, but also to all
baseball players who were suspected of steroid use. Giambi actually was portrayed as
someone who cared about his status in the game, among everyone involved.
Giambi was more sensitive, well mannered, and needy than the wild
persona he had adopted in Oakland. He wanted people to like him -- his
teammates, the fans, his manager, the writers, the grounds crew. He would
make sincere efforts to ingratiate himself with all of them…Wanting more
than anything to become a star, seeking every edge to take his game to the
next level, Giambi personified all the ballplayers who turned to steroids in
the 1990s (Fainaru-Wada & Williams, 2006, p. 124).
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While steroid use had made him a star and got him paid handsomely, after his
leaked BALCO testimony, steroids were no longer ingratiating him to his teammates, the
fans, his manager, writers, or even the grounds crew. The San Francisco Chronicle's
story and transcripts of the leaked testimony came out on Dec. 2, 2004, Giambi waited
until the start of spring training in 2005 to address the public in any way and another
three years before he publicly admitted specifically using steroids. Fainaru-Wada and
Williams (2006) wrote that when Giambi appeared before the grand jury he was "initially
nervous," but:
Giambi became relaxed, then confessed to using steroids and many other
drugs. He acknowledged that he knew precisely what he was taking.
Giambi said Bonds had introduced him to Anderson. He said he had paid
Bonds's trainer more than $10,000 for steroids. At one point, Giambi
described how he self-administered growth hormone by "pinching the fat"
on his stomach and injecting the substance just below the skin.
Testosterone, on the other hand, required an ordinary injection. (p. 207)
After the San Francisco Chronicle printed Giambi's grand jury testimony, the
press began to react harshly to the news of Giambi's steroid use, especially the New York
papers. BALCO could easily be called the first official steroid scandal. To that point there
was only smoke; BALCO added some fire to the situation. When Giambi's testimony was
printed, he was hanging out there on his own because he had admitted his steroid use to
the grand jury to avoid any further legal troubles, but he had also put himself in a tough
spot. He was the one witness who had both admitted specifically to steroid use and had
appeared to have stopped his use. The New York papers found it easy to single Giambi
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out. Never mind there were many athletes who had testified and some track athletes had
already been banned for their use, but the press hammered Giambi. He was the highest
profile confessor up to that time. Bonds had said he did not know what he was taking,
going as far as calling it flaxseed oil. Gary Sheffield had rumors surrounding him, but his
testimony was not leaked and he was probably ranked just behind Bonds in being surly
with the media, so he was not as easy a target without an admission. Despite other
witnesses, Giambi was the one athlete who came clean and the one, who the press knew
used steroids. He was identified as the biggest problem in baseball, a pariah, a dead man
walking, even the Steroid Era's Pete Rose. Rose, as a player-manager for the Cincinnati
Reds, was kicked out of baseball for life for betting on baseball and betting on his own
team in some circumstances. Rose is baseball's the all-time hits leader, yet may not be
inducted into the Hall of Fame while he's alive. Giambi is not the player Rose was and
his steroid use in the context of others' steroid use may not have been as egregious as
Rose's actions either, but at this time in the Steroid Era, Giambi was alone in that pit at
least for a few more months. With Giambi being alone in his situation, the media took a
cut-off-the-head-of-the-snake approach to fixing the steroid problem. The media called
for the Yankees to cancel his contract, for Giambi to retire, or leave the team and return
to the dirty Oakland Athletics. The last thing anyone wanted was Giambi playing
baseball. If he was gotten rid of, however it happened, it would allow New York and
baseball to continue in its innocence and MLB to work out its drug testing without a giant
black cloud hanging over it (Ettkin, 2004, Dec. 3; Kernan, 2004, Dec. 3; Madden, 2004,
Dec. 3).
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Giambi's spot in the BALCO situation also made him the smoking gun for
baseball. He was the one who admitted to steroid use and he had ties to Bonds, BALCO,
and plenty of other players. This became even more evident in Jose Canseco's Juiced,
which was released the spring of 2005. In the media's opinion, Giambi was the link to
everything else that needed to happen. He could take down Bonds and any other player if
he wanted. Giambi could push baseball into toughening its drug testing policy. He could
make the Steroid Era explode and be quickly wrapped up instead of keeping to himself
and waiting for things to slowly play out in court. In a few months, Juiced accomplished
this for everyone in Canseco's circle of teammates and users, but there would still be a
slow rollout of names over the next five years and the drug testing still took some time to
become somewhat stringent. Giambi also was someone who had embarrassed baseball.
The former MVP had made it to the top of baseball without anyone blinking an eye.
Baseball commissioner Bud Selig was compared to an ostrich with his head in the sand
and Giambi had quickly become an image problem for baseball and its testing policy.
Giambi was now an admitted cheat and he was on top of baseball, playing for the
winningest franchise down the street from the Commissioner's Office in New York.
Steroid use had been worth it to him, garnering both fame and fortune. For baseball,
steroids had sent balls out of ballparks and put fans in the seats. The lack of a testing
policy with any kind of penalty until the 2004 season showed baseball had made money
off, at the very least, negligence, and maybe in some instances off malice. Giambi, who
had been well liked in Oakland, was now the poster boy for baseball's incompetence and
lack of regard toward steroids (Madden, 2004, Dec. 3; Telander, 2004, Dec. 3).

FANS DON'T BOO NOBODIES

39

The New York Daily News interviewed Giambi's current and former teammates
after his testimony was leaked. Baseball players were as soft on Giambi as the media had
been harsh. The players also were not about to associate their names with what was being
printed. Only Tony Clark did so and his comments were simply that his thoughts and
prayers were with Giambi and his family. Players were more concerned for Giambi and
his well being than they were for making judgments of any kind. They all assumed if he
had to do it over again he would not use steroids, but they also acted as if Giambi had not
admitted to using steroids. The players had views that were probably pretty analogous to
Giambi, but they also did not want to deal with the steroid subject, much like MLB and
the Player's Union had been doing for almost five years (McCarron, 2004, Dec. 3).
While the players were taking it easy, no one was seemingly on Giambi's side, seemingly
isolating him even further. He might as well have been in the town square strapped into
the stocks. In the Times-Union, the only effects that mattered were how Giambi would
live with himself. Ettkin (2004, Dec. 3) asked over and over whether it was worth it? He
assumed Giambi thought it was and he also assumed as time went on it would appear
more and more that it was not worth it. Ettkin wrote of Giambi and the question of
whether it was worth it,
his answer, if truthful, might surprise us. Giambi is one of more than a
million North Americans, who it's estimated, illegally use steroids. And
they think it's worth it. (Ettkin, 2004, Dec. 3).
The press felt Giambi should lose the support of his teammates and fans because
he's a bad liar, cheater, and baseball player. Giambi had not handled the pressure of New
York and was not going to be able to handle the added pressure of a steroid controversy.
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After only two seasons in New York, the media wrote that Giambi had not lived up to the
$120 million the Yankees were paying him and was not ever going to do so. He used
steroids to get the contract and without using steroids there was no hope for him to ever
live up to the money and the expectations heaped on him. Giambi was also compared
unfavorably with other suspected cheaters. Gary Sheffield could play through anything
and Barry Bonds had the capacity to answer questions for the grand jury without
admitting to anything, two things Giambi seemingly could not do in the opinion of the
press. Giambi had given the media a definitive person to place their blame for steroids.
Because of Bonds' BALCO testimony, he still had not admitted to steroid use outside of
the grand jury room. While it was a stretch to believe he had not used PEDs, there was
not any admission or hard evidence. Everything that was wrong with baseball could be
seen in Giambi. At this time he was receiving the indignation for all suspected users
because he was the only for certain acknowledged user. He was in some ways the first to
face the media with some kind of admission and took the brunt of indignation because of
it.
February 2005
Giambi held a press conference a week before Juiced was released. Canseco's tellall implicated many more athletes than those who had testified before the BALCO grand
jury. Juiced was also the first time McGwire's name was brought up in steroid rumors.
Following his retirement, McGwire had been treated as the great Cardinal hero, to go
along with Stan Musial and now Albert Pujols. McGwire was referred to as Super Mark.
His long-term contract, which was signed after he was traded from the A's, was called the
second greatest thing to happen to the Cardinals' franchise behind only Branch Rickey's
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farm system, and anytime he came up in the papers he was lauded by his former manager,
GM, or anyone that was interviewed (Broeg, 2001, Nov. 14; Hummel, 2003, May 4). A
feature story in 2003, described the first time he had returned to Busch Stadium and the
Cardinals' dugout. McGwire had resisted doing interviews even over the telephone and
had been keeping a very low profile. The suggestion that he was hiding was even brought
up, but everyone interviewed for the story cast it as simply the privacy McGwire had
earned. McGwire had always valued his privacy and had earned his time away from the
game (Hummel, 2003, May 4). While he was not present in the public's mind, this same
trait would become a weakness. If you're suspected of hiding when times are good, it
does not bode well when things take a turn.
McGwire's on-field actions and even off-the-field actions when he broke Roger
Maris' record had endeared him to all kinds of people, especially in St. Louis. Enough so
that when the allegations that he had used steroids surfaced McGwire had plenty of
support. Jose Canseco wrote:
The media dubbed [McGwire and Canseco] the Bash Brothers, but we
were really the 'Roid Boys…There's been a lot of speculation about where
Mark's natural talent left off and the steroids kicked in. The answer is that
steroids gave Mark strength and stamina–but they also gave him a more
positive attitude…It took a lot of injections to get him past Roger Maris
that summer [1998]. (Canseco, 2005, pp. 74-75, 201)
Canseco also wrote about their time on the Oakland Athletics and how they both
used steroids together. Canseco frequently commented on how McGwire had the biggest
biceps in the major leagues, but the media always went after Canseco for allegedly using

FANS DON'T BOO NOBODIES

42

steroids and not McGwire. Canseco attributed it to him being Cuban, just one instance of
how Canseco tried to play himself off as the victim. More than anything else, those
assumptions made his accusations about other players a little less believable early on.
When Canseco's allegations were made public, the New York Daily News took a
look at how the rumors would affect the Hall of Fame voting for the players involved.
While most everyone implicated except Jason Giambi was at least arguably a Hall of
Famer, the Daily News wrote that McGwire and Ivan Rodriguez would be considered the
most likely to be voted in, despite the rumors. There were some writers who were a little
more skeptical and said they would not vote for any player with artificial stats. These
writers also made it clear the same questions would have to be answered by every player
who played during the Steroid Era and had a shot at the Hall of Fame (O'Keefe & Quinn,
2005, Feb. 7).
After an article ran in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch saying everyone should
consider McGwire to be guilty of steroids because of his andro use and Canseco's
accusations, the paper also ran a five letters to the editor in that Sunday's Sports section
("Taking sides," 2005, Feb. 13). Readers of the paper explained that while McGwire's
numbers could be explained, Barry Bonds' numbers could not, and Jose Canseco had very
little credibility. The readers also were insulted and felt accused of giving McGwire a
free ride. Several cited the andro incident as not giving McGwire the benefit of the doubt
and that it would hang over his reputation even if the allegations proved false. Several
also asked for the damning evidence to be presented, otherwise they would take the
innocent until proven guilty view of McGwire. The letters that were selected included
three that were in support of McGwire, one that supported the previous article but still
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gave McGwire the benefit of the doubt, and another that simply blamed Major League
Baseball ("Taking sides", 2005, Feb. 13). It was only after the allegations could be
proven that the readers said they would even consider changing their minds about
McGwire and his alleged steroid use. Canseco's allegations had caused enough of a stir
that the House Committee on Government Reform held a hearing to get to the bottom of
Juiced and to see what MLB should do to combat the growing steroid menace. The
hearing was held in March 2005. That summer Rafael Palmeiro, who denied using
steroids in front of the committee, tested positive for a banned substance. Palmeiro retired
at the end of the season, but the positive test spurned MLB to enforce an even tougher
penalty for positive tests.
June 2006
Federal investigators raided Arizona relief pitcher Jason Grimsley's house after he
accepted a shipment of HGH. Grimsley named several major league players and their
distributors, but stopped cooperating with investigators after they wanted him to wear a
wire to gather evidence against Barry Bonds.
October 2006
The Los Angeles Times printed information acquired from an anonymous source
that allowed them to view the Grimsley affidavit, but did not provide a copy. The Times
reported Brian McNamee, Roger Clemens and Andy Pettitte were named. It also said
Grimsley's former Orioles teammates Miguel Tejada, Brian Roberts, and Jay Gibbons all
took steroids. The report was later shown to be almost entirely false, but the continued
BALCO investigation into Grimsley finally pushed MLB into investigating its players.
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December 2007
The Mitchell Report was the result of an in-house investigation by Major League
Baseball headed by former Senator George Mitchell. Commissioner Bud Selig asked
Mitchell to investigate players who used steroids and other performance enhancing
substances. Mitchell carried out the investigation by interviewing club employees and
former players and going through piles of documents provided by the major league teams
and the commissioner's office. The only current player that talked with Mitchell was
Frank Thomas, an outspoken critic of performance-enhancing drugs. Thomas had also
testified during McGwire's congressional hearing. Every other player declined to speak
with Mitchell, including those who he provided a chance to respond to specific
allegations of PED use.
Andy Pettitte and Roger Clemens' involvement in the Mitchell Report stems from
the investigation into former Mets employee Kirk Radomski and Brian McNamee. Both
had worked in New York and Radomski had supplied McNamee, who was Clemens and
Pettitte's personal trainer, with performance-enhancing drugs. McNamee was hired as the
Toronto Blue Jays' strength and conditioning coach in 1998. He met Clemens during his
time there and told the Mitchell investigation he often talked about cycling and stacking
steroids with Clemens. McNamee said Clemens approached him about helping to inject
steroids and McNamee said he did so four times during the 1998 season. After Clemens
was traded to New York, McNamee was still under contract with Toronto, but the pair
reunited in 2000 when McNamee was hired by the Yankees, while Clemens also paid
him personally for off-season workouts. In 2000, McNamee injected Clemens with
steroids and HGH at least four times (Mitchell, 2007). McNamee was not retained by the
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Yankees after that season, but he continued to train Clemens and Pettitte in the off-season
up until the Mitchell Report was released (Mitchell, 2007, pp. 167-175). McNamee first
began as Pettitte's trainer for workouts after the 1999 season, his first year with Clemens
as a teammate. McNamee said Pettitte called him in 2002 when he was rehabilitating his
elbow in Florida and asked about HGH. McNamee said he injected Pettitte twice in 2002
while Pettitte was on the disabled list. Both Pettitte and Clemens continued to use
McNamee as a trainer into 2006 and Pettitte said he would continue to use McNamee as a
trainer into the future (Mitchell, 2007, p. 176). McNamee was investigated by federal
agents and entered into an agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office to cooperate in
return for not being charged for anything truthful he would say. Part of this included
speaking to Mitchell at the request of the U.S. Attorney's Office.
When the Mitchell Report was released, the media took a broad view of the
revelations regarding many players now being implicated for steroid and HGH abuse.
The media concluded that everyone in baseball shared responsibility for the Steroid Era.
Mitchell stated his goal was to shed light on the previous decade of steroid and HGH use
and the number of players included pointed to an ugly truth that plenty of people, AllStars and career minor leaguers, used performance-enhancing drugs (Futterman, 2007,
Dec. 14). The day after the Mitchell Report was released Pettitte was followed and had
his day's activities and errands reported on. All he said was "sorry, can't talk (Nichols &
Connor, 2007, Dec. 15)." Pettitte released a statement through his agent two days after
the report was released. Pettitte admitted to using HGH twice in 2002 so he could get
back to his team as fast as possible. He did not give any more details than were in the
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Mitchell Report, but he did confirm what was included in the report (Schmidt, 2007, Dec.
16).
Pettitte's statement led to more negative views of him in the press, even though he
was one of the first to confirm findings in the Mitchell Report. This is a little tricky
because had he not released the statement he would have been grouped in with everyone
who had not denied or confirmed. That would have allowed a little more time when he
was not the main focus of the media, but he also would have had more time when he had
not confirmed the findings, which was eventually viewed as a positive.
The media juxtaposed Pettitte's wholesome nature that had been on display during
his career with the HGH use he admitted to. Pettitte was a Bible-toting Yankee ace whose
admission devastated his fans and threatened his legacy (Nichols, Thomson, Samuels, &
Schapiro, 2007, Dec. 16). The Yankees said they supported him, but people on the street
were not the same. Pettitte was called a disgrace to the league and the public was
skeptical of his claim that he had used HGH only twice. Pettitte had always seemed like a
good guy, but with the Mitchell Report his good guy persona was in the past. His
statement was the bare minimum, weak, and defensive. Simply it was more damage
control than apology (Graziano, 2007, Dec. 16). The old Andy Pettitte was brought up
and the current Pettitte was not that same person. Old Pettitte was sincere, but there was
little sincerity in his statement. The new Pettitte was concerned with what he was doing
and that he knew what he was doing was wrong. He only admitted his use because he was
caught.
A somewhat more positive comparison was between Pettitte and Clemens.
Clemens approach reflected better on Pettitte than did Pettitte's statement. Just because
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Pettitte did something right by admitting, he still did something equally as wrong as
Clemens he just did not continue in his wrongdoing (Graziano, 2007, Dec. 16). Despite
actually admitting to what he had done, Pettitte was no longer trusted by the media.
Pettitte stood to gain from Clemens pushing his denial into recording phone
conversations and eventually forcing a congressional hearing because of his denial.
Pettitte was called to testify at the congressional hearing, but only had to give a
deposition and an affidavit. He did not address the media or public until spring training in
2008.
January 2008
At first, the media treated Clemens, much the same way they treated Andy
Pettitte. Early on, everyone mentioned in the Mitchell Report was included with each
other in the cloud of steroid suspicion. Only when people started to confirm or deny the
details in the Mitchell Report, did media coverage change and focus more on individuals.
Pettitte confirmed what was written about him two days after the report, while Clemens
had hired a lawyer the week before the report and released a statement roughly a week
after the Mitchell Report. The allegations in the Mitchell Report against Clemens made it
seem his production during his final four Cy Young seasons was tainted. This period of
suspicious production also brought up questions about his career numbers and longevity.
The allegations served to put his Hall of Fame induction, which had been almost assured,
in doubt as well (Hubbuch, 2007, Dec. 14). The Hall of Fame was discussed involving
other players, but once Pettitte confirmed that he had used HGH and Clemens denied that
he had used steroids, the media were more apt to focus on Clemens and his denial
(Barron, 2007, Dec. 18). After Clemens' lawyer, Rusty Hardin, offered a blanket denial of
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what was in the Mitchell Report, it became clear that fans, especially those in Houston,
would have to choose whom to believe. Clemens had settled in Houston for most of his
career. He headquartered the Roger Clemens Foundation in Houston. The foundation
presents the Roger Clemens Award to the best collegiate pitcher among other activities.
He also helped found the Roger Clemens Institute for Sports Medicine and Human
Performance in Houston. He was partly responsible for the Houston Astros trip to the
2005 World Series. Clemens was a big part of Houston and the Mitchell Report
allegations along with Clemens' denials made the public have to choose sides between
Clemens and his legacy or Major League Baseball and Brian McNamee. While many
Houston fans respected Clemens for everything he had done, they did not put aside the
steroid allegations. Houston residents that were interviewed did not chastise Clemens, but
they did not want to be associated with steroids either. They were not surprised Clemens
was mentioned in the Mitchell Report (Barron, 2007, Dec. 18). Without anything
permanent having been decided, it was still up to Clemens how Houston and the rest of
the country would view him. Clemens chose to go on what was termed by one writer a
"campaign for innocence" (Sandomir, 2008, Jan 8).
As the media continued to cover Clemens, he continued to put forth rhetoric to
control the situation. By the time he arrived in front of a Congressional Committee in
February 2008, Clemens had appeared on 60 Minutes. A day after that interview was
broadcast, he called a press conference and played a taped phone conversation with
McNamee. The conference ended with Clemens leaving in a huff, but Clemens stayed
active in trying to rehabilitate his image until the committee hearing. The committee
ended up postponing the hearing for a month, so it would have more time to let the
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investigation sort itself out. The media continued to investigate Clemens and discuss the
allegations against him since nothing had put an end to the deliberation of whether
Clemens had in fact used steroids (de Jesus Ortiz, 2008, Jan. 8; Red, Thompson, &
O'Keefe, 2008, Jan. 10). Different media outlets all portrayed Clemens similarly during
this period. He was raw, sour, had a wise-cracking lawyer, and was indignant about the
allegations surrounding him. The press became his interrogators and they were not giving
him the benefit of the doubt any longer.
The first weekend in January cued what became an aggressive defense in
Clemens' rhetoric. He produced evasive answers to questions and at one time said if he
had taken steroids he would have a third ear and would be pulling trucks with his teeth
(Sandomir, 2008, Jan. 8). In his press conference on January 7, Clemens played a taped
phone conversation between him and McNamee from the previous Friday. He also had
filed a defamation suit against McNamee on the night Clemens' 60 Minutes interview
aired. Clemens openly expressed his want to retire from the public eye and to not deal
with the media or the mess the Mitchell Report's allegations had become (de Jesus Ortiz,
2008, Jan. 8). Rep. Christopher Shays of Connecticut, who would be part of the House
Committee during the hearing, said he was not comfortable with those denials or
Clemens' body language during the press conference or the 60 Minutes interview. He also
was not comfortable with the dialogue between Clemens and McNamee. Shays even
mentioned he did not like calling people in front of a hearing when one person or the
other would be forced to perjure himself because that was looking like it would be the
case with Clemens and McNamee (Red & O'Keefe, 2008, Jan. 9). When the hearing was
postponed for a month, the committee members emphasized that the focus of the hearing
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would be to improve baseball's testing policy through what was found in the Mitchell
Report. The focus of the hearing on Clemens came about because he denied the
allegations in the Mitchell Report and brought into question its truthfulness (Red,
Thompson, & O'Keefe, 2008, Jan. 10).
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Analysis
Jason Giambi
Apologia
Giambi waited until spring training in 2005 to give his side of the story or at the
very least try to help it blow over. His agent released a one-paragraph statement in
December 2004 that simply said:
Jason Giambi is an extremely dedicated athlete and a caring and loyal
teammate. Jason loves the game of baseball, the Yankees, and the
extraordinary New York Yankees fans. Jason has always appreciated the
steadfast support of the fans who have been there through good times and
bad. He is determined, focused and working hard to form in 2005 and [to]
help the Yankees get back to the World Series ("Giambi's agent", 2004,
Dec. 7).
Giambi did not give a reason for waiting for two months after his grand jury
testimony was leaked to respond, but the press conference, which he conducted twice,
once for newspaper media and once for broadcast media, was his idea and the Yankees
organization was supportive of it. Owner Hank Steinbrenner, General Manager Brian
Cashman, and Manager Joe Torre gave statements on the same day as Giambi's press
conferences supporting. Their statements supported Giambi in his path back to playing
for the Yankees. While talking with the press, Giambi's main strategies reflected
mortification, corrective action, and minimization. Upon questioning from the media, he
attacked one of his accusers, Jose Canseco. Giambi may have only attacked Canseco
because all other allegations against him had been addressed while he was under oath.
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Based on his testimony before the grand jury, Giambi was not interested in a perjury
investigation, which would have come about if he denied his testimony or attacked the
reporters who printed it. Giambi never mentioned steroids or any other PEDs. In fact, he
never even used the word "steroids" in his time in front of the media. He avoided
mentioning anything specific by referencing the ongoing grand jury investigation and
explaining that he was not in a position to respond to legal issues. Giambi did insist
however, that he told the truth to the grand jury.
Mortification. His first statements, and something he came back to throughout
the press conference, were about how he had let people down and the need to take
responsibility for the distractions he had created. He never explicitly asked for
forgiveness, but he did say that he understood that people had their own decisions to
make when it came to how he had acted and that negative responses were fine with him.
Throughout the press conference he repeatedly mentioned that he was sorry and that he
wanted to accept responsibility for his actions. In effect, he apologized for the
consequences of his actions, but not the specific actions themselves. His comments were
in fact more of a half-mortification approach than full mortification. Giambi said:
I feel like I’ve let a lot of people down. I feel like I’ve let the fans down. I
feel like I’ve let the media down. I feel like I’ve let the Yankees down,
and most of all my teammates. I want to say sorry for that and I take full
responsibility. I wanted to make sure you guys were the first people I
wanted to talk to. I feel like I owe it to you guys…So far the times I've
come back to New York people have been really supportive and I
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understand that, and if they're not I totally understand it (Feinsand, 2005,
Feb. 10).
This is mortification, but not for his steroid use. Giambi apologized and took
responsibility for the distractions he had caused. He never took responsibility, however,
for his steroid use or the grand jury testimony that was leaked. The distractions he had
caused to those third parties were the only thing Giambi decided he needed to apologize
for specifically. Even though he attempted to hint at being sorry for what had gone on, he
did not provide any mortification for his steroid and HGH use. Giambi apologized for
being a distraction and only partially apologized for his steroid use. He did not mention
his steroid use specifically, which makes apologizing for it even more difficult. The
closest he came to discussing his steroid use in any way was stating that it did not help
him on the field. It seemed Giambi hoped he would get the same credit for his
mortification of being a distraction and his steroid use and that he was as apologetic as he
needed to be. The press' reaction and Giambi's rhetoric brings up a question of what
mortification is (or what it actually means) in the eyes of high-caliber athletes.
Corrective action. Also, several times during the press conference, Giambi
talked about a long road back. He made it clear it was not simply a road to playing
baseball again after his dismal previous season, but one to regain the trust and support of
the fans. He did not cite specifics, most notably his past behavior that included steroid
use, but he did mention he was working out hard to get back into baseball playing shape.
Giambi makes it seem that his future behavior will be much improved over the way he
had been in the past. Giambi said:
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I wanted to start at the beginning of making that long road that I know is
going to be tough and I understand, I totally do and I take full
responsibility for it. I wanted to start that road so when we got to Florida it
would be about baseball and not anything else…I’ve got a long road to go
and hopefully I can start earning back some of that support and trust and
I’m willing to do it. Hopefully (the fans) recognize me as a guy who has
faced his problems, hasn’t run from them, and is trying to overcome them,
and hopefully that’s the message that they’ll get out of this (Feinsand,
2005, Feb. 11).
His focus on earning back support of the fans and the trust of the fans, arguably
presents more of a future corrective action intended to regain his status as a player. By
failing to address the use of performance enhancing drugs, his corrective actions do not
suggest significant behavioral changes (e.g. abandoning the use of steroids), which, in
this case would seem critical to legitimate his corrective actions. In essence, he's counting
on being given a clean slate for his past behavior once he regains the support and trust
from the fans, which is not complete corrective action.
Minimization. In a familiar refrain, Giambi glossed over what steroids and
performance-enhancing drugs actually do. He said, "there's nothing out there that's going
to make you hit a baseball. It's the toughest thing to do in the world (Feinsand, 2005, Feb.
11)." This remark does not fit with the previous parts of his strategy, but it also came up
from a question by the media, so he may have actually been talking more like Jason
Giambi and not the statement for him by his agent and his publicist. Minimization is part
of the reducing offensiveness strategy. It necessarily focuses on the actions of the actor,
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whether related to the allegation or simply to the actor. This statement does not fit with
his others because it implies his past actions did not affect his performance. As
previously noted, he did not even say the word "steroid" in both press conferences, but in
this statement he implies his use and that no substance he had taken had affected his onfield performance. This minimization tries to lessen the effects of him being labeled as a
steroid user. If he did take steroids he would like to keep his legacy by changing opinions
so people would believe steroids did not help him perform better. This strategy is not
likely to be very effective based on the media and the public's opinion of what steroids
do.
Attack accuser. This strategy also does not fit with his prepared statement
strategies, but Juiced, written by Giambi's former teammate Jose Canseco, was about to
be released and the congressional hearing for Canseco and several other ballplayers was
weeks away. It was a hot topic in the press because some excerpts from the book had
been released to drum up interest in the book. Giambi was named in Juiced, along with
many others. In fact, Giambi had his own chapter: "Giambi, The Most Obvious Juicer in
the Game." Canseco wrote:
That year [1997] I witnessed what was almost the definitive case study in
the difference between the careful, controlled use of steroids I've always
advocated and sheer recklessness. I'm talking, of course, about Jason
Giambi, who became my teammate that year. As surely as he went
overboard with partying and chasing women, Giambi went overboard with
steroids…
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Giambi had the most obvious steroid physique I've ever seen in my life.
He was so bloated, it was unbelievable. There was no definition to his
body at all…
We might ask each other practical questions—especially Giambi, who was
getting an education in steroids from McGwire and me that year…
I used to be the poster boy for steroids in baseball, but today I'd have to
say the new poster boy is Jason Giambi. Before you know it, there may be
a new sacrificial lamb, a new flavor of the month. (Canseco, 2005, pp.
168-173)
Asked at the press conference specifically about Canseco's accusations and what
his book contained, Giambi said:
A lot of the things in his book aren’t true. They’re kind of false. They’re
not right. When it comes down to it, people are going to find out a lot of
the things he said are way out of control. When it all comes down to it a
lot of people are going to find out there’s not a lot of truth in it. (Feinsand,
2005, Feb. 11)
This is a peculiar incongruity between accepting responsibility for his actions and
not accepting Canseco's account of what happened. Giambi basically had said what he
testified to in the grand jury was correct, but he did not accept Canseco's account of his
steroid use, as early as 1997, putting his entire career in doubt. If Canseco could be
deemed untrustworthy then what was in Juiced would not matter and Giambi would no
longer have to respond to it. By attacking Canseco, Giambi also split the steroid accounts.
If Giambi was to be believed, the BALCO grand jury testimony and Juiced did not have
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congruent accounts. Giambi did admit he told the truth to the grand jury and that Canseco
did not have his facts right. In effect, this narrowed the scope of what Giambi and
hopefully the press would view as accurate and truthful. It would also lessen the impact
his steroid use. If his steroid use was contained to a few years around the turn of the
millennium then it could more easily be forgotten and forgiven. If Giambi had used
steroids from his first full season in the big leagues until he was summoned to testify,
then he would have a much tougher go of it with the press and the public.
Reaction
Obviously, the most glaring problem with Giambi's apologia was not saying the
word "steroids" or admitting to using them. He only said that he had told the truth to the
grand jury and that he could not give many details. The problem was that the media and
the public felt that Giambi owed them more of an explanation that he was willing to give.
For example, he neither confirmed nor denied the accuracy of the San Francisco
Chronicle's story that included his leaked grand jury testimony. Giambi simply said he
did not read it. Giambi chose not to fight his grand jury testimony; he must have assumed
that the less he talked about the Chronicle the better off he would be.
The awkwardness of apologizing without saying the word "steroids" was picked
up by most every media outlet. Without being uttered, "steroids" became the elephant in
the room. Everyone knew it was what Giambi was ultimately getting at, but he never
actually got there (Vaccaro, 2005, Feb. 11). This glaring omission in light of what the
public was hearing about the scandal kept Giambi from being believed or being viewed
as having given a sincere apology (Borden, 2005, Feb. 11). His attempt at seeking
forgiveness was not accepted by the press. Mike Lupica (2005, Feb. 11) of the New York
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Daily News even wrote that Giambi simply had not come clean. Giambi was not viewed
by the media as having been brave or noble in making his apology (Lupica, 2005, Feb.
11). The media argued that by not giving details, Giambi's apology was not as
meaningful as it could have been and it would never be meaningful until he actually
admitted to steroid use (Klapisch, 2005, Feb. 22). Much of the media felt he should have
done that in the press conference. Giambi's handlers made excuses for him. His agent Arn
Tellem explained, "if it were up to Jason, he'd tell you everything."
Analysis
Before the press conferences, he had been called the face of steroids and a
billboard for shame (Klapisch, 2005, Feb. 22; Lupica, 2005, Feb. 11). Unfortunately, the
press conference had done nothing to repair this image. However, Giambi was given a
favorable shake by the media in small doses. Unlike with his early portrayal, the media
seemed to be willing to give Giambi a second chance, not simply to play baseball, but to
make things right. He still owed them a legitimate apology and they felt it might come
faster if he was playing baseball. They did accept his grand jury testimony as the truth,
which is why they were so indignant about him not apologizing for his steroid use
(Lupica, 2005, Feb. 11). They also noticed that even though it was a half-baked press
conference, it did seem to mean something to Giambi. They accepted that maybe he just
was not ready to put everything out there, but he gave it a try and only got halfway
(Borden, 2005, Feb. 11).The media also made it seem that Giambi would not be
welcomed back unless he did become someone different. Any other mistake would not be
very easily explained away, but being a model character would go a long way in gaining
the support and trust of fans, his teammates, and the media (Klapisch, 2005, Feb. 22).
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Giambi accomplished two things with his apologia strategies, he sounded
differently than he had in the leaked grand jury testimony and he promised to put in the
effort to give the fans and his team the Jason Giambi they deserve, not the steroidenhanced version. As shown in Figure 5.1, the way in which Giambi was portrayed in the
press after his apologia, appears to reflect some small, but perhaps significant
improvements in his public image. He was still a poster boy for steroids and owed the
press and public a full apology, but Giambi was no longer a scourge on the game. The
press welcomed him back to the Yankees, not with open arms, but with the expectations
of being a better person.
Figure 5.1 Dominant Reading and Apologia for Jason Giambi
Dominant Reading
Is steroids poster boy

Dominant Reading
Apologia:

Didn't mention steroids
so apology doesn't count

Is a steroid scourge
Still owes an apology

Shouldn't play again

Mortification for
distractions

Is a smoking gun

Corrective Action

Didn't confirm Chronicle
story

Thought steroids were
worth it

Minimization of steroid
effects

Still less of man and the
face of steroids

Is a bad person

Attack Accuser

Does get a second
chance

Is a poor cheater

One of the most interesting answers from Giambi's grand jury testimony was
when he was asked, "Had this not all become public would you still be using?" He
answered, "I didn't actually notice a huge difference to be honest with you. I, of course,
got injured this year. So, that's not a fair assessment, either. Maybe, yes, no, I don't
know" (Fainaru-Wada & Williams, 2004). Maybe, yes, no, I don't know sounds very
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indifferent to the gravity the situation was receiving when the testimony was leaked and
in the months prior to the release of Juiced. By taking responsibility for being a
distraction and a poor teammate, Yankee, and public figure, Giambi at least regained
some control of his image.
By apologizing for his distractions, Giambi at least served to confirm what
everyone had thought. Unfortunately, he did not explain, describe, or give a timetable for
his corrective actions. He never came completely clean. Had he been willing to at least
speak about steroids, instead of avoiding the word all together, his attempts at
mortification may have been perceived as being more genuine and sincere. The result
may have been a more effective restoration of his image. The ongoing doubts prevented
the media, and the public, from moving on. It seemed he was looking to address the past
by not discussing it in the present.
So while he confirmed the media and public's notions of what he had done, he did
not give them the specifics they needed to be able to determine what it meant to them.
The consensus was that he was holding something back. The media wanted to piece
together the full story. The BALCO grand jury interviewed six baseball players and no
one was speaking. Piecing together the full story would have allowed the media to move
on, but he was not able to give them that. The fact that more than one article cited that he
would not even comment on the accuracy of the Chronicle's leak points to the fact that
the media was looking to know what and who could be trusted for the real facts of steroid
use and who could not. One reason for this was created by Canseco's Juiced. It was
another piece of a complicated puzzle. Like many other athletes mentioned in Juiced,
Giambi denied it and attacked Canseco for the lies he had put down in print. By agreeing
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with Canseco, Giambi would have been pointing fingers at other players as well, notably
McGwire. He would also be admitting that his entire career was tainted. If he solely
admitted to the BALCO doping then only his recent history was tainted; he would still
have five clean years beginning in 2003. So it did matter who was making the
accusations, Giambi was not about to admit to something he did not have to admit to;
hence the reason for attacking Canseco and also for not specifically admitting to steroids
or HGH. Everyone knew what BALCO had provided to the athletes. It was right there in
Giambi's testimony, yet he did not want to provide any extra information, even
information that could be argued was already public knowledge.
There was one major change in the dominant readings of the media before and
after his press conference. Whether Giambi should come back to baseball was probably
the biggest difference in pre- and post-apologia articles. The pre-apologia articles clearly
favored Giambi having his contract voided, bought out, or simply having him retire. The
media felt he should not play again. After his press conference and perhaps because of
the passage of time and the fact he was welcomed to spring training by the Yankees, the
media was much more willing to give him a second chance, even if he was not going to
be judged on his performance, but simply his character.
Perhaps what helped Giambi the most to get back to equilibrium in the clubhouse
and in the press was his play on the field. Even though the media said he would be judged
on his character, his play on the field at least helped Giambi get past being questioned all
the time about BALCO. It also helped to have Juiced come out and the first congressional
hearing about steroids that involved baseball players so there were more players than him
in the public eye. Giambi had a slow start to the 2005 season, but hit 14 homers in the

FANS DON'T BOO NOBODIES

62

month of July and was named the American League's Comeback Player of the Year after
hitting .271 with 32 homers and 87 RBI for the season. He went on to record the final hit
at old Yankee Stadium. His tenure as a Yankee might be remembered more for not
winning a World Series while there, than for his admission of using performanceenhancing drugs, although it is still probably a close second. He played six more seasons
for three different teams and will play in his seventh if he's on a major league roster in
2011. He's currently signed to a minor league contract with the Colorado Rockies.

Mark McGwire
Apologia
After the allegations of steroid use had come out in Juiced, MLB commissioner
Bud Selig decided not to investigate them, which was not viewed by a few House
members on Capitol Hill as the best course of action. Rep. Henry Waxman wrote to
committee chair Rep. Tom Davis that he felt a hearing should be held to get to the bottom
of the situation. The Committee on Government Reform held the "Restoring Faith in
America's Pastime: Evaluating Major League Baseball's Efforts to Eradicate Steroid Use"
hearing on March 17, 2005. The hearing included people Canseco had named in Juiced -McGwire, Rafael Palmeiro, and Sammy Sosa —as well as Canseco himself. It also
invited two outspoken steroid critics Curt Schilling and Frank Thomas, four medical
doctors, and four representatives from MLB.
Denial and Evasion. Each of the players was given an opportunity to read an
opening statement before each of the representatives on the committee directed questions
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to the panel. McGwire read his opening statement and answered questions with one main
strategy —to not talk about the past. In his opening statement, McGwire said:
I have been advised that my testimony here could be used to harm friends
and respected teammates, or that some ambitious prosecutor can use
convicted criminals who would do and say anything to solve their own
problems, and create jeopardy for my friends.
Asking me or any other player to answer questions about who took
steroids in front of television cameras will not solve the problem. If a
player answers no, he simply will not be believed. If he answers yes, he
risks public scorn and endless government investigations.
My lawyers have advised me that I cannot answer these questions without
jeopardizing my friends, my family and myself. I intend to follow their
advice (House Committee on Government Reform, 2005, p, 220).
McGwire clearly explained why he was about to not answer direct questions from
committee members. This approach to the hearing was a little more defensive than the
approach taken by the other players who had been accused by Canseco. Palmeiro and
Sosa denied using, while McGwire decided to not comment, basically exercising his right
to avoid self-incrimination when his previous actions were brought up. When asked what
could tangibly be done about the dangers of steroid use. McGwire responded, "I believe
that's one of the reasons I am here is to make this a positive thing instead of a negative
thing, and I will do everything in my power to turn this around from a negative to a
positive (House Committee on Government Reform, 2005, p. 241)." Rep. Sweeney
followed that question with one about how McGwire came to take andro and why he felt
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he needed it. McGwire responded, "Well, sir, I'm not here to talk about the past, I'm here
to talk about the positive and not the negative about this issue (House Committee on
Government Reform, 2005, p. 242)."
This response is probably the most representative of the strategy McGwire was
trying to take during the hearing. He tried to evade what had happened in the past
because he perceived it as negative and tried to emphasize the future and the positive
things that could take place. McGwire offered to be a national spokesman to spread a
positive message about not using steroids, which was a departure from the private person
he had been since he retired four years earlier. His use of evasion and denial was an
attempt to focus attention on the positive future instead of the negative past and was both
a legal and rhetorical strategy. McGwire answered five different questions about specific
incidents in the past with some form of "I'm not here to talk about the past." In response
to two questions, he added some statement about working for more positive outcomes in
the future, but did not specifically address anything in the past or any specifics about a
positive future. He also dodged specific questions about his legacy or the status of
records of tainted players with "It's not for me to determine." Even with this strategy,
McGwire had tried to change the frame of reference and put new light somewhere beside
in his past, but he also did not provide any new information to justify that switch in focus
and he had not stuck to the full explanation of positive outcomes in the future. He also
offered to be a spokesman in the future; this was not substantive enough to make up for
his perceived past actions. His lack of information about his past and the tempered
changes in the future were not enough to make up for his evasion of answering for his
actions. Indeed, his statements were best remembered for him not talking about the past.
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Bolstering and Good Intentions. McGwire's other strategy in the congressional
hearing was a combination of bolstering and good intentions. He hit on three positive
aspects of his character in his opening statement, but he did not touch on it when
questioned by committee members. First, he said he respected baseball and had spent a
lot of time playing it —always done so with good intentions and a desire to protect the
game. He said:
I played the game of baseball since I was 9 years old. I was privileged to
be able to play 15 years in the Major Leagues. I even had the honor of
representing my country in the 1984 Olympic baseball team. I love and
respect our national pastime. (House Committee on Government Reform,
2005, p. 219)
Second, McGwire bolstered by saying that he gave back to the community:
When I was lucky enough to secure my last Major League contract, one of
the first things I did was establish a foundation and donate $3 million of
my own money to support abused children. (House Committee on
Government Reform, 2005, p. 219)
Third, he focused on the honest and non-judgmental person he is both in his
private life and during his time in the dugout.
I retired from baseball four years ago. I live a quiet life with my wife and
children. I have always been a team player. I have never been a person
who spread rumors or said things about teammates that could hurt them. I
do not sit in judgment of other players, whether it deals with sexual
preference, their marital problems or other personal habits, including
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whether or not they use chemical substances. That has never been my
style, and I do not intend to change this just because the cameras are
turned on, nor do I intend to dignify Mr. Canseco's book (House
Committee on Government Reform, 2005, p. 220).
Bolstering is used to enhance the positives of the actor. The strategy of good
intentions tries to excuse the actions by saying they were done without the intent to do
harm. Both fall under the reducing offensiveness strategy (described in the Literature
Review section of this thesis) and McGwire used them in an attempt to build his
credibility and acceptability in the present despite what might have happened in the past.
Bolstering does not have to be related to the act and in this case, McGwire used his
record of charitable donations, his time playing baseball, his respect for the game, and his
non-judgmental nature to make him seem better (more credible, more respectable, less
offensive) to the public.
Reaction
McGwire, unlike the rest of the panel, did not take the opportunity to explicitly
deny his steroid use. McGwire simply evaded responsibility for his actions, which is a
form of denial. He was not there "to talk about the past" and he effectively balked at
discussing what had gone on or admitting to whatever he had done. While he did not
discuss steroids or HGH, he also did not answer questions about andro, so he did not
open up at all about the past. He did not use the opportunity under oath to deny steroid
use, which led to more rumors about his use (Shea, 2005, Mar. 18). If the steroid cloud
had gone away this might have worked, but it did not and once Rafael Palmeiro, who
denied his use under oath, tested positive during the following baseball season the rumors
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only increased about who was doing what. McGwire came to be lumped in with all the
other steroid and HGH users as time went on. Whenever McGwire would surface, usually
for a Cardinals event, such as closing old Busch Stadium, he would stand behind his
statement and not add anything else to it. He continued to evade responsibility for his
actions. McGwire viewed his statement to the committee as the end of the situation. Six
months after the hearing, he told the St. Louis Post-Dispatch:
I think if you guys want to go read the statement, it comes from the heart.
And that's the way it is…I'm not going to ever talk about it again. I've
moved on from it. The media should move on from it. (Strauss, 2005, Oct.
1)
This missed opportunity to set the record straight followed him even when he
came up on the Hall of Fame ballot in 2006. If it was not already clear how baseball
writers felt about McGwire before the Hall of Fame ballot, it certainly was after. He only
received about 20 percent of the vote; 75 percent is needed to be inducted. In his third
year on the ballot, he received 10 fewer votes, going from 128 to 118. Writers said if he
wanted forgiveness or mercy, McGwire would have to help them out by giving them
some more information, otherwise they would continue to assume the rumors (
Courchesne, 2009, Jan. 13; Lopresti, 2007, Dec. 28). Basically, through his silent denial
of the past McGwire had created a hole, in which, all the rumors and implications from
other steroid users were being dumped to fill in McGwire's side of things since he did not
want to fill it himself. The public simply assumed that he was a steroid user. There was
really no reason not to believe this (Miklasz, 2008, Sep. 7).
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McGwire's statement to Congress was not the end of the story for the media and,
because of the continued steroid rumors, federal investigations, and the Mitchell Report,
(an in-house investigation by MLB led by former senator George Mitchell). McGwire
was grouped with all of the other implicated players. While his name was not in headlines
as much as some others, it was in the same cloud whenever historical achievements or the
Hall of Fame possibilities were discussed (Courchesne, 2009, Jan. 13; Lopresti, 2007,
Dec. 28). His silence simply left him in the same group as everyone else. The only
defense that made sense was Courchesene's (2009, Jan. 13) attempt at excusing everyone
involved in the Steroid Era because there were rumors about almost every player, so
steroids should be a non-issue when it came to Hall of Fame voting. The uncertainty,
rumor, and lack of proof in some cases made it virtually impossible to judge correctly
who belonged in or out of the Hall of Fame. Since MLB had not expunged anyone's
records from the books there was not an official guide to how MLB was handling
historically significant situations with regard to steroid use. This was more of an excuse
for the era than it was for McGwire, specifically, but even the St. Louis Post-Dispatch
had dropped its somewhat defensive tone of McGwire after the congressional hearing, so
in effect McGwire's biggest fans had at least stopped trying to convince themselves he
was clean.
Admission. In October 2009, McGwire was offered a job as hitting coach for the
St. Louis Cardinals. He would work under his old manager Tony LaRussa. The Cardinals'
slugger Albert Pujols had publicly endorsed the move. There was only one little thing
that needed to be taken care of —clearing up the steroid rumors. When McGwire finally
admitted his steroid use, many front office personnel for the Cardinals, McGwire's agent,
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commissioner Bud Selig, and even Jose Canseco made it seem the admission was
required in order for McGwire to return to baseball, even in a coaching capacity. So his
admission was probably a requisite for taking the job. On January 11, 2010, McGwire
released a statement and held interviews with select newspapers before sitting down for a
45-minute interview with Bob Costas on the MLB Network. In his statement and
interviews McGwire took advantage of three different strategies: mortification,
minimization and bolstering.
Mortification. McGwire used his statement as an opportunity to explain how he
had wanted to handle things during the congressional hearing and he went on to put
together a timetable of his use. He did not include any details, such as those included in
Giambi's grand jury testimony or in Juiced, as to whether he would inject in the
clubhouse, what times of year he would use, or what his different cycles were. He said he
was doing something he wished he had done five years ago and to confirm what people
had suspected. McGwire also admitted to using HGH once or twice. He expressed regret
and his wish to come clean.
I used steroids very briefly in the 1989/1990 offseason and then after I was
injured in 1993, I used steroids again. I used them on occasion throughout
the nineties including during the 1998 season… I wish I had never touched
steroids. It was foolish and it was a mistake. I truly apologize. Looking
back, I wish I had never played during the steroid era. (Statement from
Mark McGwire, 2010)
McGwire continued this same type of rhetoric in his interview that evening. He
went on to portray himself as the instigator for his coming clean to the media, despite
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rumors that this was a required action before becoming a hitting coach. He also again
emphasized his desire to help the Cardinals and reiterated how stupid it was to use
steroids and experiment with HGH. McGwire also explained his congressional testimony
and why he had not been completely open in previous statements.
I was not going to lie. I was not going to lie. I wanted to tell the truth, but
because of the position I was in, and to protect my family and to protect
me I decided I would take the hits. (Highlights of Interview, 2010)
McGwire said he still could have been prosecuted for his use at the time of the hearing
and because he had not secured immunity from prosecution he decided to not say
anything.
Mortification is when the actor takes responsibility for their actions and asks for
forgiveness. McGwire did both these things. He took responsibility and informed the
public as to when he used steroids and why he had not said anything during his
congressional testimony. He called his use stupid, foolish, and a mistake and asked for a
second chance, but he did not give specific details for anything. McGwire still stayed on
the surface and tried to give the public what he thought it wanted.
Minimization. McGwire also minimized what steroids had done for him. His
view was that steroids were used for medicinal purposes and did not help him hit home
runs. Bob Costas asked if McGwire ever thought that steroids could improve his
performance on the field. McGwire responded:
No, never crossed my mind. I just believed in my ability and my hand eye
coordination. And I believed in the strength of my mind. My mind was so
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strong, and I developed that on my own. No pill or no injection is going to
do that. (Highlights of Interview, 2010)
McGwire answered a similar question later:
The only reason I took steroids was for my health purposes. I did not take
steroids to get any gain for any strength purposes…I've always had bat
speed. I just learned how to shorten my bat speed. I learned how to be a
better hitter. There's no pill or an injection that is going to give me —or
any athlete —the hand-eye coordination to hit a baseball. A pill or an
injection will not hit a baseball. (Highlights of Interview, 2010)
McGwire reinforced his achievements during his career by minimizing steroids
and emphasizing his skills, aside from his strength and durability. Costas asked if
McGwire's achievements were legitimate and if they should be taken at face value?
McGwire responded, "When I look at my hand-eye coordination and what God gave me
in my ability, I'd have to think so (Highlights of Interview, 2010)." He continued to
portray steroids as not affecting his play on the field:
I had good years when I didn't take any and I had bad years when I didn't
take any. I had good years when I took steroids and I had bad years when I
took steroids. But no matter what, I shouldn't have done it and for that I'm
truly sorry. (Highlights of Interview, 2010)
McGwire refused the notion that steroids impacted his career other than to keep
him on the field or to get him back on the field. Minimization is part of the reducing
offensiveness strategy and seeks to lessen the negative effects through minimizing the
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injury it caused. McGwire sought to do this by saying steroids did not help him hit home
runs. They only helped him stay healthy and he bolstered by saying his skills did the rest.
Bolstering and good intentions. McGwire did not bolster and explain his good
intentions as much as he had in his statement to Congress, but he did mention how he had
handled the 1998 home run chase, which shed some light on him and what he really
valued in his life. McGwire said:
I don't know if a lot of people knew, but I don't have one thing from the
'98 season. I didn't keep any of that stuff. I gave everything away to
teammates, players, coaches, umpires, people that came through. I just
wanted them to have the mementos. It meant more to me to give it to them
than to keep it (Highlights of Interview, 2010).
This one anecdote illustrates bolstering by emphasizing how selfless
McGwire is, a direct contradiction to the selfish use of steroids and other
performance enhancers. Bolstering emphasizes positive aspects of the actor even
if the positives are not directly related to the accusations. His good intentions
were to give others some type of enjoyment through his play on the field.
Reaction
Even though McGwire had denied and evaded his past actions. Once the
rumor that he would be hired as a hitting coach began circulating it was assumed
he would have to address steroids in some form. When it was confirmed McGwire
was going to be the Cardinals hitting coach, the media basically made it seem that
he would have to admit to past steroid use to avoid being a distraction in the
dugout. Ever since the congressional hearing and the validated allegations in

FANS DON'T BOO NOBODIES

73

Juiced, the public and the press assumed that McGwire used steroids during his
career. When McGwire finally came forward, what he said was not a surprise to
Houston Astros first baseman Lance Berkman (Duarte, 2010, Jan. 12) and it was
not a surprise to Rep. Tom Davis when it came to McGwire's admission (Shea,
2010, Jan. 12). The New York Post's headline was "FINALLY!" and the
accompanying story emphasized McGwire's years of silence (Puma, 2010, Jan.
12). The long wait was more pertinent because McGwire had mentioned he had
wished he could have done it sooner, so when he had finally decided to admit it,
everyone already seemed to know already.
McGwire's admission also was portrayed as a requirement for one of two
ventures, his entrance into the Hall of Fame or his job as hitting coach for the Cardinals.
McGwire was portrayed as doing things for his own personal gain, whether it was his
coaching job or to help get him in the Hall of Fame. While the reason behind his
admission was presented as self-centered, it was generally accepted that he was penitent
in some form for his actions. His minimization of steroids was also portrayed in this light,
that he did not want his accomplishments tainted by his steroid use, so he tried to keep
them separate as best he could. McGwire's attorney, after denying he did it strictly for the
Hall of Fame, said the admission was something he knew he had to do (Thompson,
O'Keefe, Red, & Vinton, 2010, Jan. 12). MLB Commissioner Bud Selig said McGwire's
contrition would make his reentry into baseball easier and an unidentified source said it
was something he had to do in order to be affiliated with baseball in any way going
forward. So even though no one specifically said he would not have been allowed in, it
was presented by the media as greasing the wheels for his return, but not as the sole
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gateway for it. The New York Post had a statement from Jose Canseco that called
McGwire's apology a first step to getting back into the game and that it was constructed
by ownership and the player's association to get McGwire back into the league (Puma,
2010, Jan. 12). Either the hard sell of Canseco, or the soft sell of the commissioner, make
it seem like McGwire had something on the line when it came to his future in baseball.
McGwire's rhetoric was not as successful in his portrayal of his numbers and
records. The media was not ready to buy his belief that steroids only kept him from being
injured and did not contribute to his home run hitting. The New York Daily News wrote
that by saying his use was for self-medication McGwire was able to characterize his
steroid use as a desperate and noble attempt to rejoin his team and help them win. The St.
Louis Post-Dispatch said he had turned to steroids as a last, rather than a first, option.
The Post-Dispatch stayed away from judging his records, but noted that when he started
using steroids and when he said he matured as a hitter occurred at about the same time
(Strauss, 2010, Jan. 12; Puma, 2010, Jan. 12). His success, McGwire claimed, had come
from a change to his mechanics to promote backspin and that did not come from a
syringe. Puma (2010, Jan. 12) wrote that McGwire downplayed the effect steroids had on
his offensive production and then wondered what effect the admission would have on the
Hall of Fame, linking the validity of his records to his chances at the Hall of Fame. The
San Francisco Chronicle focused its article on the 1998 home run record and its validity
since he did admit to using in 1998 and largely ignored the total power numbers
McGwire put up (Shea, 2010, Jan. 12).
The media disagreed with McGwire's denial that steroids enhanced his numbers
and his assertion that his numbers were valid. The San Francisco Chronicle interviewed
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Hank Aaron, Ryne Sandberg, and Rich Maris, son of former home run record holder
Roger Maris, about McGwire's records and the Hall of Fame. Maris said he felt his dad
still held the record. Sandberg said McGwire's admission put his records to shame.
Sandberg also said when it came to McGwire's Hall of Fame chances that this admission
was more like his third strike than wiping things clean. Aaron was little more forgiving of
McGwire, but did not comment directly on the records. Maris also said it was up to
baseball to decide what would become of the record and ultimately how McGwire would
be treated, either as a record holder or as a cheater (Shea, 2010, Jan. 12).
The final thing the media focused on was lumping McGwire in with the steroid
users, much like they had lumped him in with the rumored steroid users. Andy Pettitte,
Manny Ramirez, Roger Clemens, Barry Bonds, Jose Canseco, Alex Rodriguez, Sammy
Sosa, and Jason Giambi were brought up in referencing McGwire's use and admission.
The Post-Dispatch and Houston Chronicle each spent some time explaining the recent
trend of players admitting to steroid use instead of disputing it. This also brought out a
discussion of how the Hall of Fame should handle induction. Most wrote that no one
person should be blamed for the steroid era, but that every player should be treated the
same, either in or out. Admission of guilt was not brought out as something that would
factor in one way or the other.
Analysis
By the time Mark McGwire admitted using steroids and HGH, he had used up
most all the goodwill from 1998 and what little was left from his 2005 congressional
testimony. The media's reaction to his final admission did not change anything.
Everybody already believed he had used, which was not the case when he went in front
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of Congress in 2005. He did it to get back into baseball as a hitting coach and possibly to
influence his Hall of Fame status, not out of his own free will, with nothing on the line.
He had been grouped in with other users since his 2005 testimony and the accusations
made by Jose Canseco had panned out in other cases, so they had gained some amount of
credibility. Basically, by waiting five years to admit to steroid use, instead of admitting in
2005, McGwire lost a chance to gain some public sympathy. Five years of speculation
and McGwire not apologizing meant he was still viewed as a cheat and not as a
recovering cheat. His records would probably be viewed in the same way in either case,
but the public opinion of him could have been better. McGwire said he did not admit in
2005 because he was still in legal danger of being prosecuted for steroid use. While that
may have been a concern and legislators had confirmed he would not have been granted
immunity, Rafael Palmeiro denied steroid use and later that year tested positive but was
not charged with perjury so there are some doubt as to the concern of legal proceedings
against McGwire had he told the truth.
Overall, McGwire's apologia was not very effective in handling what he was
facing. As shown in Figure 5.2, McGwire's portrayals by the media only became more
certain. They did not change very much after he admitted he had taken steroids. He
became a steroid user, instead of an alleged steroid user. It was purely based on the
situation he was in. An evasive denial of his past in front of the committee when
everyone assumed he was clean only served to let suspicions grow even more. He
followed that with an admission when everyone thought he had done it. He may have
done it for the hitting coach job or the Hall of Fame, but at the very least it closed the
chapter on his steroid use. After admitting and apologizing for his steroid use, the most
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telling consequence may be seen from the Hall of Fame vote in January 2011, a full year
after his statement and interviews. McGwire received his second lowest vote total with
119 (his low is 118) and the lowest percentage of the vote at 19.8. Seventy-five percent of
the vote is needed for induction. McGwire's highest vote total in his five years
Figure 5.2 Dominant Reading and Apologia of Mark McGwire
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feel-good experience
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2005 Apologia
Denial & Evasion
Good Intentions
"I'm not here to talk about the
past."

'05-'10 Dominant Reading
Grouped w/ rumored users
Stands by his statement
Silence implicates him

2010 Dominant Reading
2010 Apologia
Mortification
Minimization
Bolstering/Good Intentions

Everybody knew already
Something he had to do
He's just like other users
Achievements are tainted

on the ballot was 128, received three times, with 23.7 percent his highest percentage of
the vote (Hall of Fame Voting, n.d.). So at least in the legacy part of his reputation,
McGwire's apologia was not very effective, but the most he had to gain from it was
probably being a hitting coach who was not a distraction to the St. Louis Cardinals.
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Andy Pettitte
Apologia
The first piece of apologia was Pettitte's statement released by his agent days
after the Mitchell Report was released to the public. In the statement, Pettitte used a
combination of three image repair strategies: denial, differentiation and mortification.
During the congressional hearing, Pettitte was bolstered by those involved, but he did not
engage in any strategies in his statement to the committee. During his press conference in
February, 2008, Pettitte used mortification, corrective action, and differentiation to
further repair his image in the eyes of the press, public, and his teammates.
Denial and differentiation. Pettitte's use of denial and differentiation was more
to control the scope of the story and not to have reporters digging for more dirt than they
already were. Pettitte led his statement with:
First, I would like to say that contrary to media reports, I have never used
steroids. I have no idea why the media would say that I have used steroids,
but they have done so repeatedly. This is hurtful to me and my family.
(Schmidt, 2007, Dec. 16)
In order to better control the story Pettitte denied steroid use and the rumors that
had circulated about him. These rumors went all the way back to the Jason Grimsley
affidavit in 2006. While Pettitte was up front about his HGH use, he wanted to make sure
that other drugs were not lumped in with his use of HGH. This served to limit the scope
of his rhetoric and reiterated that this was a stance he had always taken. Plus, he sounded
more like a victim leading with this than if he had led with an apology for his actions.
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Differentiating steroid use from HGH use is kind of splitting hairs in this instance.
Differentiation is supposed to limit offensiveness by lessening the impact of actions by
comparing them to worse actions. It limits how bad Pettitte's actions were, but only by a
little. HGH was not a banned substance when he used it, but it was illegal, while steroids
were banned and illegal. Pettitte did not specifically outline this differentiation, but he did
want to make it clear up front what the statement was about and what it was not about.
Mortification. Pettitte explained his HGH use was two days of poor judgment
and that he was uncomfortable taking HGH, but he asked that those two days not ruin his
career of hard work:
In 2002 I was injured. I had heard that human growth hormone could
promote faster healing for my elbow. I felt an obligation to get back to my
team as soon as possible. For this reason, and only this reason, for two
days I tried human growth hormone.
Though it was not against baseball rules, I was not comfortable with what
I was doing, so I stopped. This is it —two days out of my life; two days
out of my entire career, when I was injured and on the disabled list.
If what I did was an error in judgment on my part, I apologize. I accept
responsibility for those two days. Everything else written or said about me
knowingly using illegal drugs is nonsense, wrong and hurtful. I have the
utmost respect for baseball and have always tried to live my life in a way
that would be honorable. I wasn't looking for an edge; I was looking to
heal.
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If I have let down people that care about me, I am sorry, but I hope that
you will listen to me carefully and understand that two days of perhaps
bad judgment should not ruin a lifetime of hard work and dedication.
(Schmidt, 2007, Dec. 16)
This is a pretty solid piece of mortification, but the only flaw is that he used "if"
and "perhaps." He said if it was bad judgment or if he had let people down and his
actions were perhaps bad judgment. Pettitte put the qualifier in when it came to other
people's views of him, instead of simply stating his opinion. He did not use any ifs in his
press conference during spring training the next February which was a solid piece of
mortification. Pettitte explained his actions and his thinking behind them in front of the
press, the first day he reported.
I want to apologize to the New York Yankees and the Houston Astros
organizations and to their fans and to all my teammates and to all baseball
fans for the embarrassment I have caused them. I also want to tell any who
is an Andy Pettitte fan, I am sorry, especially any kids that might look up
to me.
Anyone that has followed my career knows that I have battled elbow
problems the entire time. Again, like I said before I never took this to get
an edge on anyone. I did this to try to get off the DL and to do my job.
And again, for that, I am sorry for the mistakes I've made.
As far as the situation with my dad, I am sorry for not telling the whole
truth in my original statement after the Mitchell Report was released. I am
human, just like anyone else, and people make mistakes. I never wanted to
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bring my dad into a situation like this. This was between me and him, and
no one else. I testified about my dad in part because I felt in my heart I had
to, but mainly because he urged me to tell the truth, even if it hurt him.
There are no other surprises out there. Anything else that would come up
would be definitely false allegations.
I felt like I need to come out, be forward with this. Whatever
circumstances or repercussions come with it, I'll take and I'll take like a
man and I'll try to do my job. (Text of Andy Pettitte's opening statement,
2008, Feb. 18)
Mortification is the process of admitting responsibility and asking for forgiveness.
Pettitte does both and takes responsibility for his actions very thoroughly. He not only
apologizes for drug use and for those he has let down and the embarrassment he has
caused, but he also explains why he had lied previously. Pettitte makes sure that
everything is explained and all the loose ends are wrapped up. It gives him a solid
foundation to move on from and allows him to say anything else that comes up would be
false. Without details there cannot be that much certainty put into the minds of the public,
but with the details and explanations handed out by Pettitte, the statement serves to wrap
everything into a cogent piece of mortification.
Bolstering. During the congressional hearing for Clemens and McNamee,
Pettitte's deposition and affidavit were frequently brought up and because of what Pettitte
had said he received a good deal of support from committee members that helped bolster
his image. Prior to the Mitchell Report, the press had referred to Pettitte as an honest,
God-fearing person. During the congressional hearing four people helped bolster Pettitte,

FANS DON'T BOO NOBODIES

82

while another's comments were used to illustrate the same fact —that Pettitte was an
honest and decent person. This is even more interesting because in Pettitte's statement to
the committee he admitted to using HGH one additional time in 2004. He had not
mentioned this in his statement following the Mitchell Report. Pettitte said he injected
himself and only people in his family knew about it. He later said his father had
purchased it for him and his father ultimately encouraged him to tell the truth about it.
Committee chairman Rep. Henry Waxman said:
Mr. Pettitte had never told anyone outside of his family about this
incident, but he volunteered it during the deposition because he wanted to
provide a complete record to the committee. Mr. Pettitte also provided
additional information of particular relevance to this hearing, which I will
describe later in my statement.
On behalf of the committee I want to commend Mr. Pettitte for his
cooperation. He found himself in an extremely uncomfortable position but
he did the right thing and told the truth. During his deposition he was
asked how he approached this difficult situation, and he said, "I have to
tell you the truth. And 1 day I have to give an account to God and not to
nobody else about what I have done in my life. And that is why I have said
and shared the stuff that I wouldn't like to share with you at all." Mr.
Pettitte's consistent honesty makes him a role model on and off the field.
(House Committee, on Government Reform, 2008, pp. 3-4)
Brian McNamee said under oath:
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Make no mistake, when I told Senator Mitchell that I injected Andy
Pettitte with performance-enhancing drugs, I told the truth. Andy Pettitte,
who I know to be honest and decent, has since confirmed this. (House
Committee, on Government Reform, 2008, p. 78)
Roger Clemens called Pettitte "one of the most honest people in baseball" and his
lawyer Rusty Hardin said, "everyone says that Andy is honest. We have no reason to
believe he will lie (p. 86)." On two occasions, Rep. Elijah Cummings said, speaking to
Clemens:
I must tell you that the person I believe most is Mr. Pettitte. You admit
yourself that he is a good guy. He's a truthful guy… Your word is that
Andy Pettitte is an honest man and his credibility pretty much impeccable.
(House Committee, on Government Reform, 2008, p. 156-157)
This third party bolstering on behalf of Pettitte was focused on his honesty and
decency and served to compare him to the others involved in the controversy. Pettitte
came out ahead of both McNamee and Clemens based on the agreement of everyone
involved with the hearing. Even though Pettitte's testimony had differed from Clemens,
Clemens continued to assert that Pettitte was an honest person and that he had just
"misremembered." After sorting through testimonies and asking questions, Rep.
Cummings even said the one person he believed was Pettitte. This bolstering served to
reinforce the image of Pettitte he had before the Mitchell Report. Pettitte did not bolster
during his deposition, yet because of what he said, everyone involved agreed he was an
honest and decent person.
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Corrective action. The same day Pettitte held his press conference in February
2008, he also threw his first pitching session of spring training. Getting back to pitching
for the Yankees was an important part of Pettitte's corrective action. Pettitte said:
I hope with the help from y'all that I can put all this behind me and
continue to do what I've always tried to do that is to help bring the New
York Yankees another world championship…I'm going to do everything
that I possibly can to move forward and prepare myself. (Text from Andy
Pettitte's opening statement, 2008, Feb. 18)
Pettitte's corrective action is similar to Giambi's in that he focused on baseball and
accepted that the fans and their opinions were a part of returning things to normal. Pettitte
had already apologized for using HGH and had made it clear he regretted it in the first
place and would not do it again, obviously. This action does not put things as they were
before, but it would help to return things to a semblance of normal.
Differentiation. While Pettitte had used differentiation in his early statement after
the Mitchell Report to limit the scope of the accusations against him, he used it in his
spring training press conference to specifically address why he used HGH and how he
felt he should be treated. Pettitte differentiated his legacy from that of cheater and
differentiated his HGH use from performance-enhancing to healing so he could return
and help his team. Both of these differentiations blend into one type of thinking.
Do I think I'm a cheater? I don’t'…Was it stupid? Yeah, it was stupid. Was
I desperate? Yeah, I was probably desperate. I wish I never would have
done it, obviously…I never took this to get an edge on anyone. I don't
think it helped me…All I can tell you is, from the bottom of my heart, I
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know why I did this. I didn't do it to get an edge on anyone. I didn't do it to
try to get stronger or faster or throw harder. I did it because I was told by
Mac it might be able to help my elbow. (Caldera, 2008, Feb. 19)
While Pettitte felt bad and had apologized for using HGH, he wanted his intent to
be known so the public would view him as he viewed himself. He had not used HGH to
cheat the game. He had used HGH to get back as quickly as possible. Rehabbing with
HGH went faster, it did not help him throw faster or have better control it just helped him
throw sooner. Based on that distinction, Pettitte did not feel he was a cheater. This
differentiation, along with his corrective action, was the weakest part of his apology
because it made it seem he was trying to get what he wanted, while still giving the public
what they wanted, which was an apology.
Reaction
The media listened to what Pettitte had to say and was willing to take Pettitte's
view of the situation. Pettitte was lauded for what he did, but his HGH use was still
mentioned and the Roger Clemens situation that had come to exist put the only sour note
on his apology. Clemens said Pettitte had "misremembered" the conversations they had,
but McNamee, Pettitte, former teammate Chuck Knoblauch, and even Jose Canseco had
confirmed some portion of what had been said under oath and what had been rumored
involving Clemens. There was still a question of whether Clemens would be charged with
perjury at the start of the 2008 season. That decision was not made for another year, but it
was still a dark cloud hanging over Pettitte because the HGH situation would probably be
brought up again in the perjury trial.
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The old Andy Pettitte showed up in the media's account of his press conference.
He and his apology were described as clear, direct, confident, and strong (Price, 2008,
Feb. 19). He became a role model again, a man of integrity, someone that understood
what the public wanted from their athletes (Justice, 2008, Feb. 19). Even though he had
used HGH and had not told the whole truth in his first statement, the media was willing to
take his apology at face value and see the situation in the light presented by Pettitte. They
accepted that he was sorry for his actions and he was doing the right thing in apologizing
and perhaps most importantly explaining. The importance of the apology was seen by the
amount of detail Pettitte went into. He explained why he had used HGH and why he
stopped using it. Pettitte explained why he did not bring up his other instance of use and
why he eventually did and he told the press very openly how he viewed himself, not as a
cheater or a victim, just as someone who was trying to get back to his team as fast as
possible. The press for the most part accepted this and praised him for the detail he went
into. They had been waiting for someone to explain why they used (Justice, 2008, Feb.
19). Pettitte had gone into greater detail than other PED users had and Pettitte even asked
reporters if he had answered their questions, just to make sure he was being thorough.
Plus he admitted his mistakes, others had ducked questions, answered with evasive
answers or given non-specific replies. Pettitte appeared to tell the truth because he was so
open about what had happened in the past and over the past few months since the
Mitchell Report (Blum, 2008, Feb. 19). Getting this information off his chest, especially
as it pertained to his return to the New York Yankees, was important to Pettitte and the
media focused on this as well. Pettitte's meeting with the Yankee front office was
mentioned in most every news story. The acceptance of Yankee owner George
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Steinbrenner and general manager Brian Cashman was portrayed as being important to
Pettitte. Some even suggested if there was anything Pettitte did not feel comfortable with
in returning to the Yankees he would have retired (Caldera, 2008, Feb. 19). His
teammates also were present for the press conference and each one that was interviewed
said Pettitte had done everything he had to in order to put things in their normal place. He
did not need to give a player's only apology or anything else to prove himself to the
Yankees. In fact, the only time Pettitte teared up during the press conference was when
he finished and received hugs from those teammates (Blum, 2008, Feb. 19; Caldera,
2008, Feb. 19).
The main drawback of the coverage of Pettitte's press conference was how Pettitte
and Clemens were getting along. Despite being good friends and golfing partners for
almost a decade, they had not spoken to each other in two months. When Pettitte released
his first statement admitting to HGH use, Clemens put out a statement denying the HGH
rumors. From there, the gulf only widened as Pettitte said under oath that he had used
HGH from Brian McNamee. Clemens refuted McNamee's statements and said Pettitte
had "misremembered." The press was interested in how Pettitte and Clemens were
getting along. Reporters were also interested in whether Pettitte would simply say
Clemens was lying. Being the loyal, decent friend Pettitte was portrayed as, he simply
said that he had told the truth under oath and Clemens had said what he said. That is as
far into it as Pettitte would go, which could be interpreted as saying Pettitte told the truth
and Clemens did not. Pettitte did not agree with that characterization of the statement
when it was offered and would not speak ill of Clemens (Klapisch, 2008, Feb. 19; Justice,
2008, Feb. 19; Price, 2008, Feb. 19).
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Analysis
Before the Mitchell Report, Andy Pettitte had a reputation as a stand-up guy.
Everyone who knew him liked him and he was beloved by his teammates. Following the
Mitchell Report and his first statement, he was perceived much more harshly because his
actions had not matched up with his reputation. As shown in Figure 5.3, what Pettitte did
would come to be viewed as meaningful and a good example of who Andy Pettitte is, but
using HGH was the exact opposite of who Andy Pettitte was previously. Time and the
congressional hearing helped to reaffirm Pettitte's previous persona before his press
Figure 5.3 Dominant Reading and Apologia of Andy Pettitte
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conference in February 2008. The Andy Pettitte that was lauded in the congressional
hearing was the beloved, honest pitcher of the past 12 years. Pettitte's rhetoric probably
has Roger Clemens to thank the most for how Pettitte was perceived three months after
the HGH allegations in the Mitchell Report. There was not one person on the
congressional committee who chided Pettitte for using HGH. They applauded his
honesty. Even those who were perceived as liars, McNamee and Clemens, affirmed that
Pettitte was an honest man. Clemens was more than willing to allegedly lie about his
HGH use, but he was not about to lie about Pettitte. At most, he was willing to say he
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"misremembered." The old Andy Pettitte had returned in the eyes of the media after the
congressional testimony; he just had one flaw and that was that he had taken HGH.
Pettitte was able to close his situation as best he could in front of the press in
February 2008. He was open, engaging, and apologetic for a multitude of things that all
stemmed from his HGH use. Unlike other apologies for steroids or HGH, Pettitte was
detailed, open, and available. He only held back on Clemens, but his information and
details about what he had done were enough to put him back in good graces and on the
path to recovering his image with the media. Pettitte was the only player who had been so
open and forthcoming with what he had done and why he had done it. Some people still
questioned whether that was the real story or the whole story, but no one questioned
whether Pettitte meant what he said and had done what he thought was the right thing to
do once the Mitchell Report was released.
Pettitte's rhetoric was very effective in returning his image to what it was before
the Mitchell Report. He used more strategies than the other athletes looked at previously
had, but they were well used. The Mitchell Report involved more than 80 players and the
allegations against each one were different, so his denial and differentiation was helpful
in narrowing what was pertinent in his case. His differentiation during his press
conference was a little more normal given others' insistence that steroids had not given
them any edge. Pettitte had simply argued he did not use it to get an edge and he at least
gave specific details that he only had four injections on two different instances when he
was on the disabled list. The details he provided in most every case were an important
part in getting his reputation back as an honest person. The details provided set him apart
from almost every other player who had apologized up to that time, and they were
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certainly the most detailed out of a high-profile user this side of Jose Canseco's
allegations. The details Pettitte provided also allowed for some insight into his thinking
and how he was sidetracked into using HGH. The details of his motive and his regret
helped in his mortification strategy to explain things and to come off truthful once again.
This also helped since he had held back the truth in his first statement, but then told the
truth in his congressional testimony. He also explained why he had lied and why he had
then decided to tell the truth.
Pettitte continued to pitch for the Yankees and made the 2010 All-Star team for
his third career appearance as an All-Star. Although he has not officially retired, the
media has begun to speculate he will not play in the upcoming 2011 season. While his
HGH use is brought up when talking about his Hall of Fame candidacy, Pettitte probably
has the best shot of any of the PED users for being remembered for his achievements and
his persona rather than for his HGH use. He was still a major cog in the Yankee dynasty
of the late 90s and helped them to the 2009 World Series title as well. The positive
memories of Pettitte in New York and Houston will probably continue to outweigh the
negative ones during the months of allegations and documented in the Mitchell Report.
The only hiccup on his trail to complete recovery of his image is the Clemens perjury
trial, but statements by Pettitte were ruled inadmissible and when they were used were
the grounds for a mistrial. A future trial, if pursued, would probably also rule his
statements would be inadmissible as evidence.
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Roger Clemens
Apologia
During the two months following the publication of the Mitchell Report, Clemens
had four instances where he used rhetoric to repair his image: a statement released by his
lawyer, an interview on 60 Minutes, a press conference the day after the 60 Minutes
interview, and the congressional hearing. Clemens used four different strategies to repair
his image: denial, good intentions, and victimization.
Denial. Clemens made it clear he thought the allegations in the Mitchell Report
were false. Mike Wallace read him excerpts of the allegations and Clemens responded:
Never happened. Never happened. And if I have these needles and these
steroids and all these drugs, where did I get 'em? Where is the person out
there gave 'em to me? Please, please come forward. ("Clemens
vehemently denies," 2008, Jan. 6)
In front of the congressional hearing, Clemens was just as adamant and denied
what McNamee had said.
I am not saying Senator Mitchell's report is entirely wrong. I am saying
Brian McNamee's statements about me are wrong. Let me be clear. I have
never taken steroids or HGH. (p. 21)
Brian McNamee has never given me growth hormone or steroids… (p.
123)
I've always agreed with the Mitchell Report. I have disagreements,
obviously strong disagreements [with] what this man, the claims he's made
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in that report about me. (House Committee on Government Reform, 2008.
p. 159)
Clemens used straight denial to address the claims against him. This denial also
takes on McNamee by calling him a liar, but that is what Clemens had to do in order to
deny steroid use. There was not another narrative available where his denying his steroid
use would be plausible. As Clemens made it clear in front of the committee, the Mitchell
Report did not get it wrong, McNamee had lied to them and to federal investigators. This
accusation was the main reason Clemens and McNamee were called in front of the House
Committee on Government Reform.
Good intentions. In front of the committee, Clemens tried to improve his image
in his opening statement by explaining he had played baseball with good intentions.
I have always believed that hard work and determination were the only
ways to be successful and to reach goals. Shortcuts were not an option.
This was instilled in me since I was a younger boy by my mother and
grandmother.
I am a positive person, and I enjoy doing things for others. I am not just a
ballplayer. I am a human being. Baseball is what I do; it is not who I am. I
played the game because of my love and respect for it. I have devoted my
life to it, and pride myself as an example for kids, my own as well as
others. I have always tried to help anyone who crossed my path that was in
need.
If I am guilty of anything, it is of being too trusting of everyone, wanting
to see the best in everyone, being too nice to everyone. If I am considered
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to be ignorant because of that, then so be it. (House Committee on
Government Reform, 2008, pp. 20-21)
Clemens reinforced who he was. The traits he enumerated would make him seem
to be a better person than this portrayal by some reporters as an irritated persona.
Clemens perhaps believed that if he presented himself as a hard working, honest, helpful,
charitable, trusting baseball player, he would help himself and his case in front of the
committee and in the eyes of the public. Clemens had also spent time on Capitol Hill in
the days previous to the hearing meeting with the committee members. Rep. John Tierney
of Massachusetts said committee members seemed impressed with Clemens' apparent
credibility, but things he said with great earnestness have since turned out to not be
accurate (House Committee on Government Reform, 2008, pp. 96-96).
Victimization. This strategy focuses more on Clemens' actions after the Mitchell
Report was released. Clemens alleged he was a victim of malicious lies. He showed up
on television, taped phone calls, and talked to the press even though he did not want to in
order to clear his name. He started this strategy in his released statement the week after
the Mitchell Report. His lawyer wrote:
I respectfully suggest it is very unfair to include Roger's name in this
report. He is left with no meaningful way to combat what he strongly
contends are totally false allegations. He has not been charged with
anything, he will not be charged with anything, and yet he is being tried in
the court of public opinion with no recourse. That is totally wrong.
(Barron, 2008, Dec. 18)
On 60 Minutes, Clemens said:
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I'm angry that what I've done for the game of baseball and in my private
life, what I've done, that I don't get the benefit of the doubt. The stuff that's
being said, it's ridiculous.
Twenty-four to twenty-five years Mike. You'd think I'd get an inch of
respect. An inch. How can you prove your innocence? (Clemens
vehemently denies, 2008, Jan. 6)
At the press conference in January, Clemens continued to portray his actions as
those of a victim and that he had no other choice but to make sure everyone knew these
were lies being told about him.
I made my statement through this man (Clemens' attorney, Hardin) when
it first happened. I made a statement through my foundation. That wasn't
good enough. And now I'm here doing this. I cannot wait to go into the
private sector and hopefully never have to answer it again. I've said
enough. (de Jesus Ortiz, 2008, Jan. 8)
After Clemens left the press conference, his Hardin said:
Roger is upset because such a large portion of opinion-makers presume he
was guilty in this situation and you can't argue that hasn't happened. If
you're the person that that presumption was made against, you're not going
to be happy. And when you're in a room that (has) a fair number of people
who have made the conclusion, you might just have a case of you know
what. And that's what happened today. That's why I wasn't successful in
saying, "Lighten up." (de Jesus Ortiz, 2008, Jan. 8)
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In front of the committee, Clemens once again emphasized why he was appearing
in front of a congressional committee:
I have chosen to live my life with a positive attitude, yet I am accused of
being a criminal, and I am not supposed to be angry about that. If I keep
my emotions in check, then I am accused of not caring. When I did speak
out, I was accused of protesting too much, so I am guilty. When I kept
quiet at the advice of my attorney, until he could find out why in the world
I was being accused of these things, I must have had something to hide, so
I am guilty.
No matter what we discuss here today, I am never going to have my name
restored, but I have to try and set the record straight. However, by doing
so, I am putting myself out there to all of you, knowing that because I said
that I didn't take steroids that this is looked as an attack on Senator
Mitchell's report. Where am I to go with that? (House Committee on
Government Reform, 2008, p. 20-21)
Clemens portrayed himself as a victim of lies in order to deny the allegations
made to both federal prosecutors and the Mitchell Report by Brian McNamee. The
Mitchell Report was also a problem because there was not a way to have anything
removed from it. Clemens mentioned on multiple occasions his wonderment of how he
was supposed to clear his name after the Mitchell Report and that there was not anything
he could do to change the public's opinion. The allegations were being tried in the court
of public opinion while Clemens felt they should not have been aired publicly. Clemens
seemed as though he should have been consulted by the Mitchell investigation, but he
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was in fact invited to meet with the Mitchell investigation. He said his agent did not
notify him of the chance to speak with Mitchell and he said he did not ever think these
types of lies would have been included in the report.
Under oath in the hearing, Clemens continued to deny McNamee's allegations
with hard-to-believe claims and recollections. The first instance was the allegation of
HGH use and conversations between McNamee and Clemens, as well as Clemens and
Andy Pettitte. Pettitte told the committee he had conversations in 1999 or 2000 with
Clemens about HGH. When Pettitte asked Clemens in 2005 about HGH, Clemens said
they had only talked about his wife using HGH and not concerning baseball. Pettitte felt
that was not accurate and told his wife about it. Debbie Clemens had been injected with
HGH by McNamee in 2003 and Clemens used this instance to cover for himself and said
McNamee and Pettitte did not correctly remember their prior conversations (House
Committee on Government Reform, 2008, p. 87). Clemens testimony about HGH also
came up later in the hearing where he had trouble defending his own comments on the
issue (House Committee on Government Reform, 2008, pp. 97-99).
In subsequent questioning, the issue of a 1998 MRI to investigate what could have
been an abscess or a strained muscle in Clemens buttock became an important part of
Clemens' credibility. He said the palpable mass came from a shot of vitamin B-12, but for
precautionary measures and to make sure it was not a muscle strain the Toronto Blue Jays
had Clemens get an MRI. The committee had MRI experts looked at the results and those
experts said it was "likely related to… prior attempted intramuscular injections (House
Committee on Government Reform, 2008, p. 104)." Dr. Mark Murphy said the imaging
descriptions are more compatible with a Windstrol injection than B-12 (House
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Committee on Government Reform, 2008, p. 108). The Blue Jays trainer and team doctor
each said they had never seen that kind of a reaction from a vitamin B-12 shot after
giving thousands of B-12 shots and being in the major leagues for 20 years (House
Committee on Government Reform, 2008, p. 108). Clemens lawyer had another team of
doctors look at it and they found that those conclusions could not be made from the MRI
(House Committee on Government Reform, 2008, p. 111). From there, skeptical
committee members focused on why Clemens would say he was taking B-12 shots in the
first place. Clemens said his mother had suggested he take B-12 as early as 1988 and he
said it had always been a part of his regimen, but he usually took it in tablet form (House
Committee on Government Reform, 2008, p. 95-96). Rep. Bruce Braley of Iowa listed off
people who need B-12 injections: patients who suffer from anemia or low red blood cell
counts and elderly patients suffering from senile dementia or Alzheimer's (House
Committee on Government Reform, 2008, p. 144). Clemens had no response as to why
he needed an injection of it, instead of simply taking a tablet. Clemens had said in his 60
Minutes interview that McNamee had injected him with B-12 and not steroids or HGH as
McNamee had stated. In front of the committee, McNamee said, "the first time I heard of
Roger taking B-12 was 60 Minutes. I have never given Roger Clemens B-12 and had
never heard of B-12 really before (House Committee on Government Reform., 2008, p.
95)."
The B-12 excuse was probably the best example of the claims Clemens would
make in order to make the allegations seem out of place or false. While the facts of his B12 injections and the conversations of his wife's HGH use did not hold up under the
scrutiny of questioning they did sound plausible if glossed over and not investigated.
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These two instances were examples of Clemens providing a narrative to counter the
allegations and to explain how others did not have an accurate recollection of the events.
Other instances during the hearing showed how Clemens and his counsel had become
desperate to withhold, or at least delay, certain facts from getting to the committee. These
tactics, along with two taped conversations involving McNamee, made Clemens seem
desperate to clear his name or to get McNamee to recant his testimony. First, Clemens'
team had not provided the complete MRI report until the week of the committee hearing,
even though it had been requested many times. It was finally provided after the
committee threatened stronger actions if it was not (House Committee on Government
Reform, 2008, p. 104). Second, the two investigators who interviewed McNamee a week
before the Mitchell Report was published had told the committee they had not recorded it,
but the recording was eventually produced and the investigators were obviously fishing
for information to protect Clemens against McNamee's allegations. At one point, they
asked if Clemens were to deny the allegations, would McNamee have any physical
evidence of Clemens' use (House Committee on Government Reform, 2008, p. 138).
During the committee's investigation, a disagreement between testimonies of McNamee
and Clemens about a party at Jose Canseco's house required further testimony. Canseco
was interviewed under oath, but was not able to settle the disagreements between the
differing accounts. The committee asked to interview Clemens' former nanny who, by
McNamee's account, had been at the party. The committee asked for the nanny's contact
information and for Clemens' team to refrain from contacting her before the committee
did. Instead, Clemens invited her to his house that weekend, two days after the request
was made, and then waited another 24 hours to provide the committee with her contact
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information. The committee had only interviewed her the day previous to the hearing.
Chairman Henry Waxman, of California, said it raised an appearance of impropriety and
the impression it left was terrible (House Committee on Government Reform, 2008 p.
131).
These five instances caused Clemens' credibility to be called into question
because of the actions of his team of lawyers and because of his own testimony. While he
portrayed himself as a victim, he had gone to great lengths to make sure everything
looked as though it was someone else's fault. Blaming other people's memories for
discrepancies, using his wife's HGH use to excuse any conversations he may have had
about the drug, and trying some questionable tactics to stay ahead of the investigation and
portray his accuser poorly had made Clemens look more desperate than innocent.
Reaction
After the hearing, McNamee and Clemens were still giving contradictory
accounts, the media knew someone had to be lying and they assumed it was Clemens.
When players, trainers, and doctors all had similar testimony, Clemens and his team of
lawyers and doctors came to the opposite conclusion or presented a different story.
Because of his denial, Clemens made it so committee members and the media had to
choose between McNamee and Pettitte's truths or Clemens' truths. The press considered
Clemens the one who had faced the heat; he was considered to be lying and not
McNamee, and certainly not Pettitte (Goldstein, 2008, Feb. 14; "Whose pitch", 2008,
Feb. 14). Clemens forced people to believe that everyone else was lying or making things
up about him in order for his testimony to be truthful (Lupica, 2008, Feb. 14). The way
he appeared in front of the committee did not help his case either. Joseph Tecce, a
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psychology professor and body language expert, said Clemens looked fearful of those
questioning him and avoided eye contact (Siemaszko, 2008, Feb. 14). The inflections and
voice control of Clemens made him sound more upset and had more to lose than did the
monotone McNamee. His testimony along with his body language made it seem Clemens
was putting up a smoke screen (Siemaszko, 2008, Feb. 14). Clemens obviously had a lot
on the line and had plenty to gain or lose from his testimony, yet he came off as being
stubborn and upset. His strategy made it seem as though he believed the story he was
putting forward. Clemens' rhetoric ultimately put him in a corner. He either had to
continue telling the same story, even after the public and media did not believe it, or
finally come to his senses and take responsibility for the allegations. At the very least, he
would need better explanations than the ones he presented in front of the committee
(Jenkins, 2008, Feb. 15). McNamee had provided syringes and other samples to the
committee and those tests came back linking them to Clemens, but to this day, Clemens
has not said anything different than what he said under oath. He was placed under a gag
order until his perjury trial in the summer of 2011, which resulted in a mistrial. The
prosecutor is determining whether to retry or to drop the charges.
Analysis
Clemens rhetoric was not successful because of his desperate actions to clear his
name and the rhetoric of the other people involved in his allegations. While Pettitte
gained credibility from Clemens' approach to the allegations made by McNamee,
Clemens was hurt by Pettitte's approach. Everyone looked more credible than Clemens,
even McNamee. The variety of strategies employed by Clemens tried in order to clear his
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Figure 5.4 Dominant Reading and Apologia for Roger Clemens
Dominant Reading
Forced public to
choose sides
Became indignant,
aggressive, sour

Apologia

Dominant Reading

Denial

Clemens was the liar

Good Intentions

He had more to lose

Victimization

Would continue in his
lies

Forced committee
hearing

name was surprising and, to some extent, made him look desperate to make people
believe him. He secretly taped McNamee before the Mitchell Report and before his press
conference. Clemens portrayed himself as a victim of lies, but did not do much else
beside deny the allegations and say he had always been a hard worker. Although he
called McNamee a liar and tried to cast him as the villain, Clemens still was unable to
satisfactorily explain why he still used him as his trainer for the better part of a decade.
Clemens had his legacy on the line, but McNamee had jail time on the line if he was
lying. After everyone testified in committee, Clemens came off as more protective of his
legacy and more intent on blaming anyone other than himself. McNamee was
forthcoming and under control, while Clemens made himself seem overly protective of
himself and angered by what others were doing or saying.
As shown in Figure 5.4, even with Clemens' rhetoric, the media did not portray
Clemens as a victim and continued to portray him as a liar. They saw him as stubborn and
caught in a web of his own lies (Jenkins, 2008, Feb. 15; Whose pitch, 2008, Feb. 14;
Siemaszko, 2008, Feb. 14). The other players McNamee would have lied about
confirmed the allegations, while Clemens insisted they were blatant fabrications. His
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victimization rhetoric also came to seem as though he made the wrong choice to go after
McNamee. With the information presented for everyone to see in committee, Clemens
did not seem like a victim as much as it seemed he had brought the media's judgment on
himself. There was not a logical story that would unite the two sides, and so the media
and public sided with Pettitte and McNamee. Other than saying the allegations against
him were lies, Clemens did not have other information or details to offer to make up for
the gap in the two stories. He would always return to the other person's poor memory, yet
he was completely confident in his recollection of the events.
Faced with so many other confirmations of the Mitchell Report and Brian
McNamee's testimony, Clemens might have taken too direct a path in his denial. He
could have denied the allegations and not gone after McNamee as vigilantly as he had.
Had he simply denied what was included in the report and simply given the B-12 excuse
he used in committee, he probably would not have been called in front of the committee
in the first place. Even after Pettitte had the media on his side, he would not incriminate
Clemens. Only Pettitte's deposition served to make Clemens look worse and that
deposition would not have happened without Clemens forcing a committee hearing.
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Discussion
These four different cases of apologia have different implications in how the
previous image repair strategies are used by high profile athletes. Each athlete went about
addressing the allegations against him in different ways. Every athlete used a
combination of strategies and at some point faced the press in a controlled setting. Three
of the four had to testify in front of Congress, but that was more a sign of how seriously
the Steroid Era was being investigated. The player's strategies that were used helped to
further adapt previous theories. Three of the four cases lent much greater detail to the
theory of mortification and what different effects it has as the strategy of mortification
becomes more sincere and authentic. The cases also served to add to the aspects or
contexts that affect how successful strategies can be based on the amount of information
given, perceived transparency, the use of minimization against certain allegations, the
ability to remove the news from the news cycle, the public persona leading into the
allegations, on-field actions after apologia, and the timing of strategies. These additions
adapted previous theory into a more complete look into high-profile athletes and other
people and their image repair strategies.
The individual strategies resulted in some different outcomes. Giambi and his half
apology allowed him to continue playing baseball and to gain more trust from the fans
through his play. Pettitte continued pitching and was able to put his HGH use behind him.
He was still accepted by Yankees fans and has kept the allegations from continuously
being mentioned. Clemens has continued denying the allegations all the way into a
perjury trial that ended with a mistrial. McGwire now is nothing more than a hitting
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coach for the Cardinals and his playing days and steroid use are only brought up when
Hall of Fame voting rolls around every January.
Mortification
The use of the same strategies by different players demonstrated effects that
impacted the individual situations differently, and, ultimately how the players were
viewed and portrayed by the press. The most apparent was the difference between an
authentic, sincere, and genuine mortification strategy as compared to a partial
mortification strategy. Benoit (1995a) did not focus on sincerity when it came to a
mortification strategy, but these situations did show how effective a genuine apology is
and how ineffective an insincere apology can be. The best analogy for this situation
comes in the form of atonement versus simulated atonement. Koesten and Rowland
(2004) list atonement as a five-step process in which the actor redeems his image instead
of simply repairing it. It involves a combination of mortification, corrective action and
compensation. The steps include acknowledging wrongdoing and asking for forgiveness,
revealing a changed attitude about future behaviors, repairing the situation through some
form of restitution, presenting the first three steps to the public and having them viewed
as authentic, and finally giving a public confessional where the public can determine on
the previous claims. Simulated atonement involves admitting guilt, but at the same time
explaining the situation, so it reduces responsibility and does not necessarily require any
restitution or future changed behavior (Shepard, 2009). Simulated atonement looks only
at the short term and works only when the act is not salient for the audience and there are
reasons to back the actor. The main difference between atonement and simulated
atonement is that the five steps of atonement are shortened to two. Simulated atonement
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skips having a changed attitude, repairing the situation, and presenting evidence of
changes to the public. Simulated atonement only evades responsibility and apologizes.
The difference between Giambi and McGwire's mortification and Pettitte's
mortification is not quite the same as simulated atonement and atonement. Simulated
atonement only talks the part of atoning for the earlier actions, while atonement goes
through the entire process. The mortification of Andy Pettitte was full, complete, and
sincere. It meets the standard for mortification. The mortification of Mark McGwire was
self-serving and not overly detailed, while the mortification of Jason Giambi was partial
and somewhat evasive. McGwire and Giambi were penitent in their actions and in their
demeanor, but did not quite explain their situation as completely as the press would have
liked. Giambi's apology would be an example of a stunted mortification. His
mortification was not fully formed or complete. Giambi acted the part of mortification,
but did not speak the part of mortification. Giambi appeared apologetic. He was taking
the situation seriously, but he was not prepared or ready to apologize for everything he
should have. He wanted to appear apologetic, but did not apologize completely.
McGwire's apology was different in that he had what appears to be an ulterior motive.
His mortification is an example of can be termed incentivized mortification. He did not
receive the same response from his apology as Pettitte, partly because his apology did not
include anything the public would not have guessed before his admission and partly
because he was gaining something from it other than being forgiven. McGwire appeared
apologetic, but did not put everything out there and appeared to hold some things back,
whether details and specifics or the real reason for apologizing nine years after his
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retirement. The best thing McGwire received from his apology was the reason he
admitted in the first place —to return to the game of baseball.
These different approaches to mortification provide a deeper understanding of the
theory of mortification as an apologia strategy. Benoit (1997) wrote that someone at fault
should admit it immediately, unless wanting to avoid litigation is a higher priority than
repairing one's image. While Benoit maintained mortification should be the first choice of
strategies when the actor is at fault, Giambi and McGwire did not seem to use
mortification as their first choice; it was included in their eventual strategies, but it was
not where they turned originally. Pettitte's original public statement was heavy on
mortification and it was his main strategy throughout the media's interest in the
allegations. Giambi used mortification, but because he did not give a full apology or
explanation it does not appear that it was his first choice. Giambi seemed to want to skip
to the path of regaining his fans through baseball and not through rhetoric. McGwire
obviously chose another strategy at first, but later decided mortification would be his best
approach to get what he wanted.
A stunted mortification such as Giambi's only serves to show the direction the
actor is moving in. He was approaching the situation as somewhat penitent, yet he was
not completely ready to admit to everything and explain everything in detail. A stunted
mortification is an apology for something, but not for the specific act responsible for the
situation in the first place. Giambi apologized for being a distraction, but not for his
steroid use which caused the distraction. This would be the same for apologizing if
anyone was offended for an act, and not apologizing for the act itself. Stunted
mortification accomplished more than denying the allegations, but it also was not nearly
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as effective as true mortification. A stunted mortification also does not completely close
the book on the actor. More problems in the future would bring back the allegations from
before. The half apology or the movement toward a full apology was not valid if poor
behavior continued and in some people's eyes was not valid to begin with. Future actions
would not be looked at as two different instances, but one continuous behavior problem.
An incentivized mortification such as McGwire's serves to show he was
apologetic, but mainly serves to get him a job as a hitting coach and possibly into the Hall
of Fame. The sincerity of his apology was hurt by having an ulterior motive as well as by
having come several years too late. An incentivized mortification falls short of an
authentic mortification in the information given and the explanation for past actions. It
also comes at a time when a certain positive consequence comes from making the
apology at that time. In McGwire's case it was a job as a hitting coach. For a current
player, it would be reinstatement from a suspension or other situations where a public
statement must be made, but the sincerity of the statement may not be totally taken into
account. It serves to check something off a list and does not make the apology top
priority.
This means that a genuine mortification is not necessary if simply moving on is a
higher priority than repairing one's image completely. An incentivized mortification can
provide one good result, but not the best image repair. An authentic, sincere mortification
strategy must be complete in order to accomplish the most effective image repair. The
true amount of image repair that is desired can help determine if an authentic
mortification strategy is required or desirable. If less information being given out is more
important than being loved by the masses, then an authentic mortification strategy may
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not be the best decision. These three different types of mortification all lead to different
outcomes and different levels of image repair. These findings adapt the theory of
mortification and better define strategies that are categorized as mortification.
News Cycle. A complete mortification also serves to exhaust the news cycle. If a
complete account or description is not provided along with mortification there is always
another story waiting to come out with more information about the allegations. With all
of the information regarding the allegations in the public eye, there is not anything more
to report on. It provides a valid close to the situation as long as no new information
comes out. By answering the questions the press has and admitting to what has been
done, mortification can serve to help everyone move on from the allegations and allows
for the spotlight to focus on another story.
Transparency
Another variation in the strategies different players used was the amount of
information provided, no matter which specific strategy was used. This is related to the
public relations principle of transparency and providing viable, useful information to
pertinent publics. Players either barely gave information to support their strategies or
exhaustively explained their thoughts and actions. Benoit (1997) wrote that adequate
support should be provided for the image repair strategies in order to persuade the
audience. Pettitte was able to persuade the press and the public that he had made a
mistake and was still an honest and decent person, while the other three cases did not
present all the facts. The amount of information released also helps to show how
important the image repair strategies are to the actor and how sincere they are about the

FANS DON'T BOO NOBODIES

109

situation. The amount of perceived truthful and accurate information seemed to correlate
to the amount of persuasion the strategies could affect.
Public Persona
Another factor that seemed to affect strategies was the actor's public persona or
the audiences view of the player prior to the allegations. Pettitte, who had the most
successful apologia, also was viewed by the public most positively before the allegations.
He was an honest, decent, God-fearing ace pitcher for the Yankees and Astros. McGwire
probably had the second-best persona because of his home run record and the magic of
the summer of 1998 among the population as a whole, not just sports fans. McGwire
missed his chance to affect this by waiting to admit to his steroid use. The five years he
waited only allowed doubt and rumor about him to become the perception of him.
Giambi was a playboy and the well-paid Yankee slugger. His persona was more of a
tabloid presence because of his partying days in Oakland and his conflicts and pursuits in
a Yankee uniform. This type of a persona did not lend itself to being the born-again,
repentant slugger recovering from his steroid use. Finally, Clemens' persona best
reflected how his strategies were received. Before the Mitchell Report allegations,
Clemens was a divisive personality to the public as a whole. He was beloved in Texas
and New York, but not in Boston or many other baseball markets. This love/hate
relationship also carried over to his denial strategy. Only some people believed his stories
of others misremembering, while many more did not accept his claims. A more positive
public persona made strategies more successful and also provided some help in those
strategies. Also, if people have a positive view of an athlete they would be more likely to
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defend or bolster for that athlete, as in the case of Pettitte and the committee members
during the hearing.
Future Actions
Actions after the strategies or at the very least, the intention for actions, did lend
themselves to improving the acceptance of image repair strategies. This may be the entire
basis of Giambi's image repair strategies. He knew he had the opportunity to play
baseball that season and positioned himself to take full advantage of his time on the field.
His image was rehabilitated by his play on the field, thus glossing over the deficiencies of
his rhetorical strategies. In essence, returning the Yankee clubhouse to the way it was
helped Giambi, both with his distractions and with his steroid past. Not all of the players
had this opportunity to showcase their "clean" skills against what they had done
previously under false pretenses. McGwire and Clemens did not have this type of future
intentions to make up for their steroid pasts. Pettitte had limited his HGH use to only four
instances while he was on the disabled list, and as such did not have much to show
differently when he was on the field and healthy. Kruse (1981) wrote about this as well.
The player who has upset the norms of the sport has the opportunity to address
allegations with concrete actions that serve to return the team to equilibrium or at least to
allow the fans to view the player as a good teammate and individual. The accused must
make the situation seem stable and make sure distractions are decreased or eliminated.
Giambi in fact really only apologized for his distractions, which would mean he was
betting on the Yankees equilibrium and success bringing him the image he desired and
not his rhetoric. This suggests just how corrective actions and future behavior can affect

FANS DON'T BOO NOBODIES

111

image repair when the actor will still have time under the spotlight and will not retire
from the public eye.
Ineffective Minimization
One problem with each player's strategy was the use of minimization. The use of
minimization was very similar among the two players who used it as a strategy. McGwire
and Giambi both minimized the effect steroids had on their performance. Neither of their
minimization strategies affected what the media addressed after their press conferences or
congressional hearings. Benoit (1997) wrote that minimization cannot always be
expected to improve one's image. It involves making a serious problem seem less so.
With McGwire and Giambi, the problem was their steroid use and minimizing steroids'
usefulness and effectiveness in the game of baseball only brings up more questions. Why
would these athletes use steroids if they did not help? This claim is not believed by many
in the public because the perception of steroids is that they make people bigger and
stronger and able to hit home runs easier. Minimization can lead to a view that the actor
has not taken the allegations as seriously as the public. The effects of this strategy helped
confirm and describe what had been written previously.
Time
Time is also a factor in these strategies. Coombs (2006) wrote that being quick
was the first lesson in being successful with image repair and crisis communications. The
majority of the four players' strategies were part of press conferences or congressional
hearings that were held months and even years after allegations arose. Specifically,
strategies for baseball players did not seem to be affected by waiting until spring training
to address allegations. Waiting until spring training gave the allegations and situations
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surrounding the players time to calm and settle, so the press conference was able to be
more complete if that is what the player wanted to do. In-season allegations tend to be
addressed quicker, while off-season allegations were only addressed completely before
the start of the next season.
This may also factor into Kruse's (1981) equilibrium argument. The allegations of
baseball players during the off-season do not affect how the team plays on the field, so as
long as they are addressed before the season there is not any extra harm done in the fans'
minds. This is opposed to regular crisis communications, where the immediacy of
addressing allegations and problems is an important part of the strategy. Especially if
there is a disaster or problem, more harm can be done possibly to the public or to the
image of the company, association, or person the longer the situation is left alone. Yet
with athletes, the off-season seemed to be a safe haven, where instant communication
was not needed. Basically, the content of the image repair was more important than the
form of the strategy. If the same strategies were used quickly after the allegations the
results would arguably be the same, but anything that was not completely taken care of
would be brought up again during spring training. These situations also involved leaks to
the press or investigations where more information could turn up before spring training,
so waiting until the new information had stopped flowing may also have been of interest
to the actor. This may differ with in-season allegations. McGwire addressed his andro
allegations the day after the allegation was printed. This finding adapts crisis
communication theory and applies it specifically to athletes or other situations where
there is an off-season or something of the sort. The off-season is probably more of an
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exception than anything, but with enough media interest it would still be beneficial to be
quick about talking with the press.
Linked Allegations
Another factor that affected the success of image repair strategies was the linked
nature of allegations. Clemens and Pettitte were accused of similar actions by their
former trainer Brian McNamee. They took very different approaches to the allegations. In
circumstances such as this one, it is more beneficial to either be the first one to address
the allegations or to be completely honest or at the very least decide who the public will
believe more if two opposite strategies are used. These situations would seem to be
decided by the public and press and not necessarily by the strategies. If either had faced
these allegations alone then the effects may have been different.
In conclusion, the apologia used by athletes to restore their image depends on the
situation they are in and what the player wants to accomplish with his rhetoric. The most
useful and successful strategy out of these four cases was a genuine mortification. Other
strategies were not as consistently useful and persuasive when it came to the media's
resulting portrayal, while even a stunted mortification strategy brought some positive
effects. Mortification strategies also helped to have stories removed from the news cycle.
By putting all the facts into the public eye, genuine mortification leaves nothing else to be
found and serves to finish a story's relevance when it comes to the media. Minimization
strategies did not help improve the player's image from any allegations that involved
performance-enhancing drugs. These findings both help support prior research and also
add a little more depth to the best practices in certain cases and situations involving highprofile athletes.
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Limitations
This study only looked at texts of media portrayals that provided insights into
apologia strategies. It did not interview the athletes to determine their intentions and
expectations for their actions and strategies. The scope of the study was limited by the
number of cases that could be studied. Many of the newer instances of steroid allegations
have involved highly public reports of athletes testing positive for steroids rather than
leaked information or findings from federal investigations. These different circumstances
could affect which image repair strategies are used and which are successful.
Roger Clemens' perjury trial, which resulted in a mistrial, may not finalize
Clemens' apologia. Before a mistrial was declared, Clemens wasn't slated to testify in his
defense. With another perjury retrial not a sure thing, Clemens won't have a ruling on
whether he lied to the committee.
Future Research
Future research that could stem from these results would include studying
individual image repair strategies and their uses over many different situations and
contexts. It would provide greater insight into the strengths and weaknesses and different
levels of use each strategy has. It could provide more depth to the strategies and would
help to expand image repair strategies. Another study that would be valuable would be to
study public personas of the actor pre-and post-apologia to determine how they affect
strategy choices and the success of those strategies. It would also help to uncover what
reputations have longer lasting effects and which reputations do not mingle into the
public's opinion when bad situations occur. Finally, future research should consider
comparing athletes from different sports to determine how allegations are perceived
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across these activities. Does the type of sport, the nature of the performance, or its public
prominence impact the consequences to the athlete and how he or she responds to the
allegations? It might be interesting, for example, to compare cyclists with baseball
players.
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